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Executive summary 
The EU is a multi-faceted, multi-method and multilevel foreign policy actor, trying to propagate its 
norms to other states and IOs. In an effort to make EU foreign policy more coherent and consistent, 
the Member States have replaced the rotating Council Presidency, as a foreign policy actor, with the 
EEAS and the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Replacing the Council Presidency with the High Representative at the UN meant that the EU needed 
an enhanced mandate, which was passed in 2011. What remains unclear it what the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the enhanced UN mandate meant for the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States at the UN. This is what this thesis is investigating.  
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between the EU and its Member States during the negotiations 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the Sustainable Development goals (SDG) in order 
to compare their relationships at different points in time and thereby show how the Lisbon Treaty and 
the UN mandate change affected this relationship. 
 
The change in the relationship is investigated as a structured, focused controlled case comparison, 
based on semi-structured interviews. The thesis will be structured by asking the same questions of 
each case and focused by deriving the questions from the theory. It is a controlled comparison study 
as choosing the MDG and SDGs as cases holds the policy- arena and content somewhat constant. 
 
Principal-agent theory (PA) is the basis for the theory-derived questions and is applied to interpret the 
data generated by the semi-structured interviews. The applied theoretical concepts are: moral hazard - 
specifically, drifting, shirking, and slippage - as well as ex ante and ex post control mechanisms. The 
case specific analysis, regarding the relationship between the EU and its Member States during the 
MDG and SDG negotiations, found that: 
 
The EU was involved in laying the foundation for the MDGs as the EU had a coordination role in the 
UN conferences in the 1990s and in the OECD DAC’s work to turn the results from the conferences 
into development goals. The EU was, however, not involved in the actual negotiation of the goals. The 
EU was subject to extensive control mechanisms, that limited the its possibilities for slipping, drifting, 
and shirking since the Member States were present in all the relevant arenas in the process. This 
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meant that the Commission was almost certain to lose trust if it drifted or shirked and did not follow 
the wishes of the Member States.  
 
The first part of the analysis also shows that the EU had the mandate to coordinate the Member States, 
in order to develop common positions that the EU presented at the UN. This mandate changed with 
the institutional setting. In the Open Working Group (OWG) the EU would present the common 
positions, but the OWG structure made their coordinating task more difficult. The institutional 
structures changed in the intergovernmental negotiations causing the Member States to accept 
stronger EU coordination. Direct oversight procedures were the main control mechanisms, which 
prevented the EU from drifting and shirking. When the EU proposed a negotiation tactic the Member 
States disagreed with, they would discard that proposal and have the EU follow their preferred 
negotiation strategy. The EU had to report back to the Member States when it had informal meetings, 
which further limited their moral hazards.  
 
The comparative analysis shows that the EU were less involved in the MDG process compared to the 
SDG process, for several reasons. The Commission was disorganised during the MDG process and the 
Member States did, therefore, not completely trust the EU in development matters. Whereas, in the 
SDG process the Commission and the EEAS did not have to go through the Council Presidency and 
the Member States also wanted the EU to have a stronger coordinating role, which enabled the EU to 
be more involved. The Lisbon Treaty gave the EU a coordination role in international organisations 
(IOs), which gave them a legitimacy they did not have prior to the Treaty. 
Furthermore, the analysis also identified three motives for the EU to take a stronger role in the SDGs. 
The policy content in the SDGs suited the EU better, as it had a broader perspective than the MDGs. 
Secondly, the EU Member States also have to fulfil the SDGs, causing EU coordination to become 
more relevant. Finally, the policy content is more similar to EU policies in the SDGs than it was in the 
MDGs.  
 
The second part of the comparative chapter compares the findings with the insights from the 
theoretical preconceptions. The findings are primarily consistent with the theoretical preconceptions. 
Strong control mechanisms reduce the risk of moral hazard, but we have also found that strong 
control mechanisms are not necessarily expensive or established for economic reasons.  
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However, three of the findings in the chapter could not be explained within the PA theoretical 
framework but nevertheless influenced the EU-Member States relationship. The EU stayed out of the 
MDGs since its the development policy was disorganised and distrusted by the Member States. 
Secondly, appointing a former Member State’s UN ambassador to be the EU’s representative at the 
UN, meant that the EU could act more effectively as the Member States’ representative. Finally, the 
EU’s motivations in the process seems to be based on increasing trust and legitimacy, rather than 
material gain. 
 
The discussion considers the findings from the analysis in relation to findings made by other 
researchers. It concluded that the thesis’ findings lends support to some of the conclusions drawn by 
other researchers and are at odds with others. Chiefly regarding autonomy in bargaining and arguing 
negotiations, and the level of EU cohesion at the UN. 
 
The conclusion summaries these findings and recommends that PA theory is adjusted to take into 
account immaterial rewards and sanctions. Such an adjustment would somewhat alter how the 
principal-agent relationship is viewed, especially considering that the core assumption involves 
differences in preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis investigates the European Union (EU) in international organisations (IOs) and will examine EU 
coordination at the United Nations (UN) by investigating how involved the EU was in the development of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The first part of this 
introductory chapter will present considerations regarding the EU as a foreign policy actor, the chapter will then 
proceed to discuss the changes to EU foreign policy aspects in the Lisbon Treaty. The third section will focus on 
the enhanced UN mandate the EU got in 2011, while a fourth section will be on the Millennium- and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. The final part of the introduction reviews academic literature that focus on the 
EU in IOs. 
1.1 EU as a foreign policy actor 
EU policies are numerous and diverse, but none are probably unaffected by outside influence, 
whether it be policies on the environment, social policy or trade. The EU has implemented policies 
and measures that give it a presence outside its borders; it has delegations in a majority of third 
countries (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014: 2), it is the world’s largest donor of development aid, the 
world’s biggest trader, and has conducted about 30 civilian and military missions on 3 continents 
since 2003 (europa.eu visited 15.02.16). 
It can also be argued that European integration is foreign policy at its core and was so from the 
beginning; the ECSC and EEC were meant to foster better relations between the European states 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014: 2), but it is no longer simply a result of foreign policy it now also has a 
foreign policy (ibid: 3). This means that the EU is a complex foreign actor because of its ‘multifaceted’ 
(diverse policy fields), multi-method’ (using different methods) and ‘multilevel’ (both European and 
national level) approach to foreign policy (ibid 1). EU foreign policy is therefore not only conducted at 
multiple levels, by Member States and the Commission, the executed policy is also developed in a 
bargain between the Commission and the Council. 
 
The EU’s foreign policy is according to Manners (2002) guided by its norms. The EU is a civilian 
power that is able to propagate its norms through various forms of interaction with other actors. This 
is why the EU can be considered a normative power (Manners, 2002). The EU propagates its norms in 
various ways: One of the processes is the institutionalisation of its relationship with other IOs such as 
the UN and WTO. This is illustrated by the presence of EU delegations in other countries or in IOs 
(Ibid). Critics of this approach to EU foreign policy argue it has inherent weaknesses: It is reductionist, 
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it neglects power, and it inherently is normative, which limits its potential for a critical perspective 
(Hyde-Price, 2006: 218).  
 
But which norms are the EU trying to spread? According to Manners (2002) the EU is trying to spread 
norms regarding peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. As well as less obvious 
norms such as: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance 
(Manners, 2002: 243).  
1.1.1 Treaty change 
A significant development in the EU’s efforts to spread its norms was the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty was signed the 13th of December 2007 and entered into force the 1st of 
December 2009. It created a new role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HRUFASP), which replaced the role of High Representative. The former High 
Representative would “only” assist the Foreign Affairs Council, whereas the new HRUFASP is 
president of that council as well as vice president in the European Commission. The idea is that the 
HRUFASP is able to span the boundaries between the EU institutions and the different dimensions of 
the EU’s foreign affairs. In order to fulfil this task, the Lisbon Treaty created a European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which consists of a central administration and representations in third 
countries and IOs. This was seen as an attempt to strengthen the coherence and consistency of the 
EU’s foreign policy, which was a main objective of the treaty (Reynaert, 2012: 207-208). It can, 
however, be questioned whether these organisational changes in the EU’s foreign policy actually 
makes it more coherent and consistent. This is not the case according to Reynaert (2012). She argues 
that the creation of even more EU foreign policy actors such as the EEAS and the HRUFASP will make 
it even harder to coordinate the EU foreign policy, causing it to be more incoherent and inconsistent 
(ibid: 224-226). 
1.1.2 UN mandate change 
The European Economic Community was invited to be an observer in the UN in 1974 (UNGA 
Resolution: 3208). As an observer to the UNGA you have free access to most meetings and to relevant 
documentation (un.org 1, visited 15.02.16). In 2011 the EU was invited to take part in the work of the 
UN and had its status at the UN upgraded. This allows the EU to speak at the UN meetings and to 
make proposals, but not to put forward candidates for UN positions or to vote in the UNGA. The 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty seems to have motivated the change of the EU’s status at the UN. It is 
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argued in the resolution that this upgrade of the EU’s status is necessary, because the EU is no longer 
represented by the Member State that has the European Council Presidency (after the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty). The EU is instead represented by the HRUFASP, the Commission and the EU 
delegation (UNGA A/65/L.64). According to Guimarães (2015) “... it marked clearly the evolution of 
the EU at the UN, realising the vision in the Lisbon Treaty and recognising the unique nature of the 
Union.” (Guimarães, 2015: 88). The initial observation is that the resolution does not provide the EU 
with sufficient rights to fulfil the mandate in the Lisbon Treaty and it still functions as a supportive 
actor for the EU Member States rather than their combined voice (Wouters, Odermatt, & Ramopoulos, 
2011: 4). However, the effect of the resolution remains unclear and it depends on how it will be used 
in practice (ibid: 8). 
1.1.3 Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals 
Two other significant developments within the UN has been the adoption of the Millennium- and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. The Millennium Summit was held in 2000 as part of the 55th General 
Assembly of the UN. The summit brought 149 Heads of State and Government and high-ranking 
officials from over 40 countries together and unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration. The 
declaration consisted of eight goals that have been dubbed the Millennium Development Goals and 
they consist of issues such as climate, education, equality, healthcare, and poverty (un.org 2 visited 
15.02.16). “The Millennium Summit was the largest gathering of Heads of State and Government the 
world had ever seen and launched a new vision for the future for the UN” (Huéhenno, 2002: 72) and 
has shaped UN policies in the following 15 years. 
A new agenda on sustainable development with seventeen goals for the next fifteen years was made 
in September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit (un.org 3 visited: 15.02.16) with more 
than 150 world leaders participating (un.org 4, visited: 15.02.16). The goals encompass the earlier 
MDGs, and also additional issues such as energy and resources. Though the goals are not legally 
binding, they rather uniquely apply to all countries, rich and poor, and the UN expect countries to 
take ownership and establish frameworks to achieve the goals, but the results, ultimately, rely on the 
participating countries. After having presented considerations on the main issues in this thesis we will 
now proceed to review literature on the subject of the EU in IOs, in order to identify a research gap.  
1.2 Literature review 
We will in this section briefly review the recent academic literature on the EU within IOs with impetus from the 
book “EU with(in) international organisation” edited by Armandine Orsini (2014). This is done in order to get 
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an overview of the theoretical framework, methods and findings in the present academic literature on the subject. 
In the first section of the literature review, articles that studied EU in IOs in a general way will be reviewed. In 
the second section articles focusing on the relationship between the EU and the ILO will be reviewed. Research 
regarding the EU and the WTO is reviewed in the third section. The fourth section reviews EU coordination 
efforts in the G8. The fifth section proceeds to review research on the EU at the UN, while the sixth section 
summaries the insights gained from this literature review. This should help us identify research gaps, so we will 
be able to design the research in this thesis in order to help close some of these gaps. 
Both Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve (2014) as well as Gehring, Oberthur & Mühleck 
(2013) studied the EU’s participation and recognition in IOs at an overall level. Debaere, De Ville, 
Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve investigated how EU participation can develop from five different 
statuses of varying degree of institutionalisation: member, participant, observer, attendant and absent. 
The study shows that both political and legal factors are important when determining the EU’s 
participation in an IO. The authors show, drawing on historical institutionalism, that IOs are affecting 
the EU as well as the EU is affecting the IOs. The study also shows that the EU’s influence in certain 
IOs (like the WTO) are on the rise. This inclusion of the EU in IOs can change over time, but it is rather 
constant and hard to change (Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve, 2014). Gehring, 
Oberthur & Mühleck investigated under which conditions the EU is being recognized as a relevant 
actor in IOs. They used theories on actorness, international institutions, and corporate action, studying 
six cases including the IMF, WTO, FAO and WHO. They found that formal status takes a backseat to 
action capabilities in the governance area meaning that the EU’s formal status has little effect whether 
the EU is being considered a relevant actor. What does have an effect on whether the EU is being 
considered a relevant actor, is to what degree the EU controls the governance mechanisms within a 
given area. The stronger governance mechanisms the EU has the more the EU will be considered a 
relevant actor (Gehring, Oberthur & Mühleck, 2013). 
 
Several researchers have studied the relationship between the EU and the ILO. Drawing on 
documents from the European Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European 
Parliament, and the ILO, Kissack investigated labour standards at the ILO and the EU’s past 
participation in the organisation from 1956 to 1991 using a mix of intergovernmental and 
neofunctionalist theory. He studied how the consistency between the EU and the ILO had developed 
over time. He found that the consistency has developed through three stages. The first stage is 
institutional consistency, followed by institutional and vertical consistency and finally reaching 
Page 11 of 96 
 
institutional, vertical, and horizontal consistency. The Member States reacted as expected by 
intergovernmental theory and took the Commission to the ECJ, in cases where they felt it had 
overstepped its boundaries. He also found that the EU used the ILO strategically to pursue a 
harmonization of Member State policies. The EU downloaded ILO policy in the beginning while it 
later has been able to upload policy as well (Kissack, 2014). 
Xiarchogiannopoulou and Tsarouhas (2014) also studied the EU’s relationship with the ILO. Instead of 
drawing on intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as Kissack (2014) did, Xiarchogiannopoulou 
and Tsarouhas used discursive institutionalism and Europeanisation. They looked at whether the 
actorness of the EU in the ILO had been successful, when it comes to diffusing its policy regarding 
flexicurity preferences, to the ILO. Drawing on interviews they found that the EU is strategically 
trying to upload flexicurity as a policy to the ILO, by emulating ILO discourse. The EU is successful in 
uploading the flexicurity model, but the ILO is also successful in adapting that model to its own goals 
and interests. The EU is also downloading policy from the ILO. However, the EU has strengthened its 
voice within in the ILO, due to being a member for a long time (Xiarchogiannopoulou & Tsarouhas, 
2014). 
Both studies found that the EU had downloaded ILO policy, as well as been successful in uploading 
its own policy preferences to the ILO.  
 
Another relationship between the EU and an IO that has been investigated by several researchers is 
the relationship between the EU and the WTO. Crespy (2014) looked at EU consistency using a multi-
level governance approach to study the position of DG Trade, the Member States, and civil society 
organisation when it comes to liberalising public services in the WTO. She found that the Commission 
does not only experience institutional constraints but also political constraints when conducting policy 
in the name of the EU Member States in this area. This is because there is a disconnect between the 
position of several EU Member States and DG Trade, which has long-term reputation costs for the EU. 
The downloading effect of the WTO-rules into EU law has been lowered as the Commission tries to 
find a common ground between the free trade preferences in DG Trade and the preference for 
protecting the EU’s social model in some Member States (ibid). 
Damro (2007) is another researcher that has studied the EU’s relationship with the WTO. He did a 
comparative analysis of the EU’s participation in the International Competition Network (ICN) and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) from 2001 to 2006 using principal-agent (PA) theory, in order to 
understand, who makes the decisions for the EU in trade negotiations and whether it is the EU or 
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certain Member States whose interests are being promoted in the negotiations. Damro found that the 
EU Member States had stronger control mechanism in the area of trade policy as it was perceived to 
be distributive, while competition policy was seen as being less important and thus the Member States 
had less control mechanisms in place (Damro, 2007). Billiet (2009) also looked at the EU in the WTO 
studying the Commission’s autonomy and influence in intellectual property rights disputes in the 
WTO using PA theory and drawing on qualitative interviews. Billiet focused on the discussion of this 
issue, as there was significant difference between some Member States and the Commission. Billet 
found that the Commission was able to drift away from the mandate it was given because of a 
strengthened position in the WTO (Billiet, 2009).  
 
Niemann and Huigens (2011), like Billet (2009), drew on PA theory, but unlike Billet they studied the 
EU’s involvement in the G8 from 1977 and onwards. They found that the admission of the 
Commission into the G8 was supported by the non-G8 EU members and opposed by the EU G8 
members. The non-G8 EU members won that fight and the EU was allowed to participate in the G8 
meetings. Niemann and Huigens found that two oversight mechanisms were put in place, and they 
were mainly used by the countries in favour of EU participation in the G8. The Commission had to 
report to the bodies of the Council on G8 aims and results, and EU co-ordination was arranged on the 
Council meeting before a summit. As the non-G8 EU members subsequently have lost interest in the 
G8 meetings as their decisions are non-binding, they have become less interested in controlling what 
the EU does at the G8 meetings (Niemann & Huigens, 2011). 
 
Nedergaard and Jensen (2014) also used PA theory to study EU coordination at the UN before and 
after the Lisbon Treaty. Using interviews with key actors the authors showed that strategic 
considerations as well as commitment has improved EU coordination at the UN. This is especially 
true for the institutional coordination, where the Presidency and the Commission usually work well 
together. This also applies to the coordination between the Member States and the Commission. 
However, the UK was opposing a greater role for the EU at the UN and took steps to limit EU 
coordination. The authors concluded that the Lisbon Treaty had increased EU consistency within the 
UN, improving both coordination and participation (Nedergaard & Jensen, 2014). 
Molnar (2012) is another researcher who analysed how the Lisbon Treaty has caused changes in the 
way the EU acts in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Molnar investigated whether the changes to 
the Lisbon Treaty regarding foreign policy had indeed led to stronger coordination between the EU 
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Member States in the UNGA. He compared the voting records of the EU Member States in the UNGA 
before and after the enactment Lisbon Treaty as well as interviewed diplomats involved in the 
coordination. He found that there has been no real change and European foreign policy should still be 
seen through a state-centric lens (Molnar, 2012).  
 
Debaere (2015) also studied EU coordination in IOs. Instead of studying EU coordination in the 
UNGA, Debaere studied EU coordination at the G20 meetings in the areas of finance and 
development. He found that the level of coordination varied between the two policy fields. The 
coordination was strongest in the area of finance where the Member States were able to systematically 
share information and discuss negotiation strategies with the Commission as facilitator. In the area of 
development policy, the EU position was developed as “a result of consultation between the several 
services within the European Commission without the active involvement of EU member countries” 
(Debaere, 2015). 
 
As this brief literature review shows, quite a lot of attention has been given to researching the EU 
within IOs. Investigating whether the aim to strengthen the foreign policy coordination between the 
EU’s Member States with the Lisbon Treaty has gotten a lot of scholarly attention. The WTO followed 
by the ILO seems to be the IOs where the EU’s involvement has been given most attention. Whereas, 
less attention has been given to the EU’s involvement at the UN. Principal-Agent theory seems to be 
the most commonly used theoretical framework and document analysis and interviews seem to be the 
most commonly used methodological frameworks. Nedergaard & Jensen (2014) studied the EU 
coordination in the UNGA using PA theory at a general level and Molnar (2012) studied voting 
records in the UNGA using IR theory. Based on the studies examined in this literature review, we 
have identified a research gap as none of these studies investigated the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the relationship between the EU Member States and the EU at the UN using case studies. By using 
case studies to investigate the relationship between the EU and its Member States, it should help us be 
more precise and specific about the nature of this relationship as there are some concepts like 
relationships that are difficult to quantify (George and Bennett, 2005: 70). Using case studies to 
investigate the EU’s relationship with its Member States also gives the possibility of bringing new 
insights into the field, as case studies allows one to discover new variables (ibid: 74).  
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1.3 Puzzle 
In the previous section we have shown that the EU is a multi-faceted, multi-method and multilevel foreign 
policy actor, trying to propagate its norms to other states and IOs. 
The Member States have, in an effort to make the EU become more consistent and coherent in the area 
of foreign policy, changed the treaties. The treaty change created the position of High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a diplomatic service to assist the High 
Representative. Subsequently the EU was invited to play an enhanced part in the UNGA. These 
changes to both EU foreign policy institutions (2009) and the subsequent change in the EU’s mandate 
and involvement in the UNGA (2011) were adopted after the MDGs (2000) and before the SDGs 
(2015). What remains unclear is the effect on the relationship between Member States and the EU 
when the EU is acting at the UNGA. These considerations have led us to ask the following research 
question. 
1.4 Research question 
What factors of the relationship between the EU and the Member States determine EU involvement in the UN 
development goals and how was the involvement affected by the Lisbon Treaty and Resolution A/65/L.64? 
 
The aim of this research question is to investigate how (A) the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent 
Resolution A/65/L.64 in the UNGA affected (B) the relationship between the EU and the Member 
States, when they developed the EU’s foreign policy regarding the MDGs and the SDGs This is done 
in order to discover which opportunities the EU had for pursuing its own agenda and which 
mechanisms the Member States had to control the EU in the area of foreign policy. We seek to 
understand and open the ‘black-box’ of EU foreign policy creation and the decision-making process 
behind it. 
The research question, the PA theory and the methodology serve as the foundation for the working 
questions. The working questions will be presented in the end of the methodology chapter and 
provide the structure for the analysis as well as the discussion. 
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2. Cases 
The previous chapter identified a research gap and presented the research question. Now we will present the 
fundamental information about the cases we are going to analyse, before we can begin the analysis in earnest. 
This chapter will, therefore, be a rather short description of the processes, as we know them, that led to the 
Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. This knowledge, combined with 
insights from our theory, will be the foundation for the interviews. 
2.1 Millennium Development Goals 
This section will briefly present the process that led to the development of the MDG goals. It is important to 
highlight the most important inputs that influenced the process as it is somewhat disorganised process. 
Cursory investigation indicate the MDGs are a UN creation and has it roots in the Millennium Summit 
in September 2000 and We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan in April 2000. However, the exact origins of the goals are hard to define and it 
requires a longer time horizon. A more thorough investigation shows the MDGs were not created by 
the UN alone, but also involved the OECD, World Bank and the IMF (Hulme & Scott, 2010: 294). 
Furthermore, the origins of the MDGs are widely accepted to be “the series of UN conferences that 
took place in the 1990s” (ibid: 294). The process that led to the creation of the goals was not even 
premeditated or structured and has “no clear start or end” (ibid: 297). 
 
The UN was, if not the most influential organisation then the primary forum in which the goals were 
discussed. It was the UN conferences in the 90s that proved to be the foundation for the goals that 
were agreed upon (ibid: 294). It was also Kofi Annan who tenaciously worked to make the first UN 
assembly of the new millennia a success, which led to the Millennium Declaration signed by 189 
countries (ibid: 296). Although it was not the goals in this declaration that had the largest influence on 
the eventual MDGs, it created the necessary momentum that resulted in their creation in 2001 (Hulme 
& Scott, 2010). 
If the UN provided the momentum, the OECD provided the substance. The MDGs have less in 
common with the goals in the Millennium Declaration and more in common with the International 
Development Goals made by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in their 1995 report 
Shaping the 21st Century (ibid: 296, 297). 
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Having two sets of development goals was however a problem going into the new millennia and 
representatives from the OECD, UN, IMF, and the World Bank met in 2001 and decided the UN 
should control the MDG process, although the MDGs that were agreed upon at the meeting, and 
published in the Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, were 
primarily the IDGs (ibid: 297). 
2.2 Sustainable Development Goals 
Whereas the MDG process was quite unorganised and unfocused, the SDG process has been more thoroughly 
planned and executed. This section will briefly summarise the process leading to the development of the SDGs. 
We are aware the SDGs undoubtedly have their roots in the MDGs, but we view the decision to set up a 
working group to develop the SDGs as the starting point for this case in order to make the cases distinct and to 
be able to analyse them separately. 
2.2.1 Setting up the Open Working Group 
One of the central results of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable development in June 2012 
was an agreement amongst the United Nations Member States to start a process that would develop a 
set of sustainable development goals. The results from the conference did not state any specific goals 
but instead clarified that the SDGs “should be limited in number, aspirational and easy to 
communicate” (sustainabledevelopment.un.org, visited 01.04.16). The goals should address all the 
three dimensions of sustainable development and be coherent with the UN development agenda 
beyond 2015. 
 
A 30 seat group were formed to prepare a proposal for the SGDs called the Open Working Group 
(OWG). The OWG were created on 22nd of January 2013 with resolution 67/555 of the General 
Assembly. The UN Member States decided to employ a constituency-based system of representation. 
This meant that most of the seats in the OWG were shared between several countries 
(sustainabledevelopment.un.org, visited 01.04.16). 
2.2.2 The Work of the OWG 
The OWG met and discussed different sustainable development issues for eight thematic sessions 
lasting from two to five days between march 2013 and February 2014. Mr. Macharia Kamau of Kenya 
and Mr. Csaba Kõrösi of Hungary were elected co-chairs of the OWG. The Co-chairs met with “major 
groups and other stakeholders the morning before each OWG session” 
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(sustainabledevelopment.un.org 1, visited 01-04-16). The steering committees were responsible for 
engaging stakeholders and major groups and for developing position papers (ibid) so their input 
could feed into the process. A website was launched in order to collect inputs from other non-state 
actors who were not part of the steering committees. The website made it possible for other groups to 
upload their analysis, proposals and opinions, that would also feed into the work of the OWG. Figure 
2.1 is an illustration of how the work of the OWG was structured.  
  
Figure 2.1  
 
(Source: sustainabledevelopment.un.org 2, visited 15.02.16) 
 
From March to August 2014 the OWG developed and wrote the proposal for the SDGs to the 68th 
session of the UNGA on the basis of the inputs from the stakeholders and major groups (Programme 
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of Work March - August). Figure 2.2 is a timeline that illustrate this process. The process concerning 
the inputs from the website established to get input from civil society is illustrated above the timeline, 
while the OWG process is illustrated below the timeline. 
 
Figure 2.2  
 
(Source: http://www.sdgseinventory.org) 
 
The intergovernmental negotiations started after the proposal was sent from the OWG to the UNGA 
for adoption. These negotiations took place from January to July 2015. The representative from the UN 
Member States as well as stakeholders and major groups met for ei 
http://www.sdgseinventory.org/timeline.phpght different series of meetings in that period. In these 
meetings the wording of the declaration, the nature of the goals, their implementation, the 
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development of indicators to measure the SGDs as well as the finance for the SDGs were among the 
issues discussed. 
 
In July 2015 the “financing for development” conference took place in Addis Ababa where Heads of 
State as well as representatives from the EU met to discuss development finance. One of the issues on 
the agenda at the conference was the UN beyond 2015 agenda (un.org, visited 01.04.16) The 
development of the goals in the OWG and the final intergovernmental negotiations and the financing 
for development conference seems to be interlinked as the financial issues connected with the SGDs 
seems to have been discussed at both venues. 
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3. Theory 
In the literature review we reviewed several studies that examined the EU’s involvement in IOs, some of which 
applied the principal-agent theory. We will in this theory chapter examine the principal-agent theory in order to 
gain theoretical insights that will enable us to understand the relationship between the EU Member States and 
the European institutions, when the EU is acting at the UN. PA theory offers a good model for understanding 
this relationship, as the theory highlights critical aspects of such relationships and offers possible explanations as 
to how and why the relationship is the way it is. We will first give an overview of the aspects of PA theory, 
which are relevant for our thesis, followed by a short analysis of other studies that have used PA to investigate 
EU involvement in other IOs. We will then look at critique of the PA theory and rational choice theory, which is 
the foundation on which PA is build. At the end of the chapter is a conclusion that summarises the most 
important results. 
Max Weber identified a relationship that is widespread within politics - an asymmetrical information 
relationship. In this Weberian relationship the authority is placed with one actor while the 
information advantage is placed with another actor (Miller, 2005:203-204). Like a newly elected 
politician that is head of a department of highly competent civil servants, who are experts within their 
fields. The politician will know less about cases in the department compared to the civil servants, but 
has the formal authority over the civil servants. Weber suggested that the power was in the hands of 
the expert, but is this always that case? 
 
Principal-agent theory is a model that addresses these information asymmetries. It assumes like 
Weber a relationship in which an agent has an information advantage and is capable of making 
decisions that affect both the agent and the principal. The principal on the other hand has the 
authority to impose incentives on the agent, for example offering an economic incentive or threatening 
to remove privileges from the agent. This is where PA theory departs from Weber’s idea about 
information asymmetries, as PA is focused on the leverage that the power to impose incentives gives 
the information disadvantaged principal. Especially, whether the principal can incentivise the agent to 
take the same actions as the principal would have taken if she had the same information (Miller, 2005: 
203-204). 
It is called “moral hazard” if the agent acts against the preferences of the principal (Eisenhart, 1987: 61, 
Miller, 2005: 205) to the detriment of the principal (Billiet, 2009: 439). Moral hazard can result in two 
different actions from the agent that will hurt the principal. These actions are called drifting and 
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shirking. Drifting is when the agent has the incentive and the ability to follow her own preferences to 
the detriment of the principal (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108). Shirking takes 
place when the agent does not put in the effort that the principal expects of her (Damro, 2007: 886, 
Eisenhart, 1987: 61). If an agent shirks of drifts, it can in some instances be a result of slippage. 
Slippage can be defined as “a process when the structure of the delegation itself provides incentives 
for the agent to act against the preferences of the principals” (Billiet, 2009: 439). 
By incentivising the agent to act as the principal would like, the principal aims to limit shirking and 
agency costs, which are the losses the principal faces when failing to align the actions of the agent 
with her preferences (Miller, 2005: 204). The incentives put in places changes the risk calculations of 
the agents and her actions. The agent becomes disincentivised to either miss a reward or be subject to 
a sanction by the principal, which is why the agent’s actions when offered an incentive will be more in 
line with the wishes of the principal. If the actions of the agent can cause harm to the principal, one 
way of creating an incentive is to transfer some of the risk from the principal to the agent. This 
discourages the agent from acting to the detriment of the principal, as the agent now shares that risk 
and not only harm the principal, but also harms herself (ibid: 204-205). 
 
Economists have developed six features that a relationship must have in order to be characterised as a 
PA-relationship (Miller, 2005: 205-206). These are: 
 
1. Agent impact. The actions of the agent impact the payoff for the principal 
2. Information asymmetry. The principal has knowledge about the outcome, but not of the 
agent’s concrete actions. 
3. Asymmetry in preferences. The agent is assumed not to have the exact same preferences as the 
principal. 
4. Initiative lies with a uniform principal. The principal is able to rationally offer incentives to the 
agent as a first move. 
5. Backward induction, based on common knowledge. The principal and the agent has the same 
knowledge of how the game is structured, effort costs and possible outcomes. 
6. Ultimatum bargaining. The principal is able to make a ‘take-it or leave-it’ offer. 
 
These six conditions leave to possible outcomes, which are: 
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1. Outcome based incentive. The principal chooses an outcome based incentive, to transfer the 
risk to the risk-averse agent, and thereby keep it in line. 
2. Efficiency trade-offs. The principal will have to add an extra incentive for the agent to accept 
the risk if an outcome based incentive is chosen. 
 
These six conditions and two possible outcomes have been relaxed in various ways when the PA 
theory has been applied to political science. One of the assumptions that has been relaxed is that the 
principal has to be uniform. In some cases, several principals with conflicting interests employ an 
agent. This entails that the principals are able to compromise on which kind of outcome they are 
looking for (Miller, 2005: 211-212). This is a particular important aspect of our research considering 
there are currently 28 Member States in the EU and it is extremely unlikely they are in agreement on 
the issues in the MDGs (15 member states at that time) and the SDGs. 
 
Another assumption that has been relaxed is the assumption of backwards induction. In the economic 
version of the PA theory the principal has full knowledge about how the game is structured and can 
therefore offer the agent an incentive only big enough to cover its opportunity costs. The assumption 
is relaxed so there is room for inefficiencies as several studies have shown that full knowledge about 
the structure of the game is not always present (Miller, 2005: 211-212). We consider it extremely 
unlikely that the Member States have full knowledge (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 19) about every single 
part of the two agreements including potential outcomes and the influence the EU can have. This 
means the Member States make their decisions with this uncertainty in mind and probably seek to 
minimise risk. 
 
A further addition to the principal-agent theory is that the principal, like the agent, can be subject to 
moral hazards, which means that she cannot make efficient decisions on her own. This means that the 
principal might delegate authority and decision power to the agent in an area where the principal on 
her own could have made a decision, but still chose to delegate the decision to the agent (Miller, 2005: 
220-223). Delegation of authority from a principal to an agent in order for the principal to escape her 
own moral hazard could for example be states that delegate authority to supranational institutions. 
This delegation of authority to supranational institutions has been studied by Pollack (1997). 
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3.1 Why delegate? 
Pollack (1997) identifies four reasons why principals might want to delegates tasks to a supranational agent. The 
four reasons could become relevant for our analysis of the EU at the UN, when examining why Member States 
delegate to the EU, and we will, therefore, present Pollack’s four reasons. 
The first reason identified by Pollack (1997) is that principals that make an agreement with each other, 
all have imperfect information about the actions of the other parties in the agreement and whether 
they are honouring it or not. This is why it sometimes makes sense to delegate responsibilities to a 
supranational agent, and in our case could be the task of monitoring compliance and transgressions of 
the agreement. The agent will be able to name and shame any principal that is not honouring the 
agreement, thereby reducing the transaction costs of the other principals who are part of the contract 
(Pollack, 1997: 103). Delegating this responsibility to an agent means the principal does not have to 
allocate time and resources to check whether the other parties honour the agreement. A supranational 
agent that has the task of monitoring the principals can also be given the competence to take action 
against transgressors, as is the case in areas where the EU has exclusive competence and can initiate 
infringement cases against Member States that violate the treaties. However, this might not be directly 
applicable in our case studies considering they deal with external policy and are not in the category of 
exclusive EU competence, but the cases span a variety of policy fields and it could potentially become 
relevant for parts of the agreements. 
 
A second reason for a principal to delegate authority to an agent is incomplete contracts/agreements. 
It is almost impossible and certainly very time consuming to spell out every obligation for all the 
parties, in all eventualities, in detail. This means situations might arise that are not specified in the 
contract, which poses the question: who is then going to decide the responsibilities of the parties if 
they are not clearly stated in the contract? This is why it makes sense to delegate the tasks of filling in 
the blanks in a contract to an independent agent, most likely a court (Pollack, 1997: 103). The 
responsibility to enforce the contracts or “fill in the gap” does not rest with the EU in our case studies, 
unless the EU makes separate legislation in order for the Union as a whole to uphold its part of the 
international agreement, but this would require the consent of the Member States. 
 
A third reason for delegating authority to a supranational agent is to ensure independent regulation 
and to remove some of the complex regulatory issues from the principals. In this case the agent would 
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adopt regulations too complex “to be considered and debated in detail by the principals” (Pollack, 
1997: 103). Authority might also be delegated to an agent if principals need a credible and 
independent actor that would have no incentive to be lenient on the parties under regulation (ibid: 
104). Even though it is an important reason for delegating authority to an agent, we do not expect this 
to be present in our cases considering it is primarily relevant when studying internal EU policies and 
not external policies, where the EU has no authority over the non-EU countries. 
 
A fourth reason for delegating authority to a supranational agent is to ensure continuity in policy 
making. If every member of a democratic parliament or organisation has the right to make proposals 
you risk that there will be many proposals that stand no chance of gaining a majority, but time and 
resources will, nevertheless, be spent debating such proposals. 
If principals of the parliament or an organisation delegate the task of agenda setting to an agent, who 
seldom has an incentive to put proposals on the agenda that cannot be passed, it would make policy 
making more resource efficient. In this case the committees become the agents of the principal as is the 
case when a parliament delegates some of its authority to a committee. The members will strive to 
become part of the committee that deals with the issues that interests them the most. Membership of a 
committee gives people more power in the that area, while members of other committees in turn will 
have more power in their areas. The members of the committees will over time become experts in the 
policy area of the committee, while other members in other committees are developing other expertise 
(Pollack, 1997: 104-105). This can become relevant, as the EU might have the role of coordinating the 
actions of the EU Member States at the UN to ensure they use their time and resources more 
efficiently. 
 
When a principal delegates authority to an agent it has several side effects. It is important to get an 
idea about the risks the Member States take when they delegate authority to the EU and what kind of 
actions we have to look for when analysing the effects of the delegation, which is why we present the 
possible side effects of delegation. According to Pollack “there is almost always some conflict between 
the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it” 
(Pollack, 1997: 108). This is because agents are opportunistic and pursue their own interests. This can 
lead to shirking, bureaucratic drifts and slippage, which can lead to a loss of agency for the principal. 
It is possible for the agent to, drift, shirks and slip because of an information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent, favouring the latter. This makes it difficult for the principal to control and 
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evaluate the actions of the agent. However, the principal is not powerless to overcome these 
challenges. When delegating authority to an agent the principal can put in place administrative 
procedures to limit the scope for agent activity and to limit the possibilities for the agent to shirk 
(ibid). One example for how administrative procedures can limit shirking and drifting, would be 
having a contract when employ someone to wash stairs. You limit the agent’s possibilities for 
shirking, by specifying in the contract how often and how many stars the cleaner are going to wash. 
This also limits the potential for drifting, as you can point to the contract if the cleaner decides to drift 
and wash more stairs than agreed and tries to charge you for it. 
 
We expect the EU to have the least opportunities to drift, shirk, and slip in the case of the MDG 
process, where it had limited participation and influence at the UN, but this might be different in the 
case of the SDG process, which was after the Lisbon Treaty and the UN mandate change. The EU’s 
autonomy is one of the issues we want to examine in this thesis, which is why we picked cases before 
and after institutional changes that could have affected the EU’s ability to drift, shirk, and slip. 
3.2 Control mechanisms 
The principal has several control mechanisms that it can use to limit negative side-effects from delegation to an 
agent. We will now present these tools, as they present the possibilities the Member States have to limit the 
moral hazards for the EU, and what we might find in our analysis when examining the EU-Member States 
relationship. 
Control mechanisms (Billiet, 2009: 440, Damro, 2007: 889, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 438, Pollack, 
1997: 108-109) are of two types. One type is ex-ante, which is the precautions the principal takes to 
limit the negative effects from delegation, the other type is ex-post mechanisms, which are the tools 
that let the principal interfere in the workings of the agent. Control mechanisms are, however, costly 
so the principal will only implement them if they cost less than the costs incurred by not having them 
(Pollack, 1997: 108-109). 
 
We examine the ex-ante control mechanisms first. The ex-ante control mechanisms, the principal can 
use to limit the side-effects from delegation, are administrative procedures. These administrative 
procedures lay out the structure of delegation; scope of the agent’s activities, and which legal 
instruments the agent can use, as well as which procedures the agent must follow (Pollack, 1997:108). 
In the analysis we will use the terms ‘mandate’ and ‘rules’ when we refer to what Pollack calls 
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administrative procedures. Differentiating between the different administrative procedures improves 
the accuracy of the analysis. The terms, mandate and rules, are more specific to the cases we are 
studying and further divide the concept into the agent’s responsibilities and the confines of their 
actions. 
 
We now proceed to examine the ex-post mechanisms available to the principal. One type of ex-post 
control mechanism is oversight procedures. Oversight procedures allow principals to monitor the 
behaviour of the agent, thereby minimising the informational asymmetry. This makes it possible for 
the principal to either punish or reward the agent based on behaviour. These sanctions can take many 
different forms and can also alter the structure of delegation, thereby, changing the ex-ante control 
mechanisms (Pollack, 1997: 109). 
 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) have also discussed control mechanisms, with a focus on the US 
congress. They define two different forms of control mechanisms; “fire alarm” and “police patrol” 
oversight, which both being oversight methods fall into Pollack’s (1997) category of ex-post control 
mechanisms. 
Fire alarm oversight is decentralized and entails less activity, costs, and involvement on the part of the 
principal, compared to more classical forms of oversight. Instead the principal in the case of the US 
congress: 
 
“Establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and 
organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge 
executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and 
Congress itself.” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 166). 
 
These rules and procedures are made to give outsiders, like citizens and interest groups, information 
about the agent’s decision making processes. Making this information available is supposed to give 
interested parties the opportunity to discover misbehaviour and either challenge the agent 
themselves, or alert the principal of the misbehaviour of the agent (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 166). 
This method is however criticized because many people might not be represented by an interest 
group, which means that nobody would be complaining if their rights were violated (ibid: 172). The 
process of developing the MDG were very top-down, whereas the process of developing the SDG 
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involved both NGOs and businesses, who could start the fire alarm if the process develops in a 
direction they do not like. We do not expect these outside actors to affect the EU-Member States 
relationship, but we will pursue this issue if it is mentioned during an interview. 
 
Another ex-post tool the principal can use to limit the side-effects of delegating authority to an agent 
is “police patrol oversight” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 166). Like a real police patrol oversight, it is 
“centralized, active and direct: at its own initiative” (ibid). Using police patrol oversight means that 
the principal actively inspects the actions of the agent in order to discover misbehaviour and to deter 
the agent from misbehaving in the future. The police patrol method is however criticized for missing 
minor violations, as it is a very resource demanding method of exercising oversight (ibid: 172). This 
could be meetings with the Council to decide on a strategy, but as Niemann & Huigens (2011) found 
this can become ceremonial and irrelevant (Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 427). It could also be direct 
oversight in the form of Member State representatives being present when the EU performs its role as 
actor. 
 
The third oversight tool the principal can establish is institutional checks. This entails establishing 
several agencies with different kinds of incentives or objectives. In this system of institutional checks 
an agency might be created to report on the behaviour of the agent to the principal or given the power 
to stop or block the activities of the agent (Pollack, 1997: 111-112). Both the EU Parliament and the 
Council serve this function, but the Council is to some extent not an agency separate from the Member 
States considering it contains their own representatives, though it can definitely limit the actions of the 
Commission. The EU Parliament has general oversight procedures in the form of budget control, 
approval of the Commissioners and numerous meetings with the Commission. However, given the 
intergovernmental nature of the UN negotiations, we do not expect the Parliament to be involved in 
the process, but we will examine their role if it is mentioned in the gathered empirical data. 
 
Distinguishing between ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms and additionally separating those 
concepts into lesser parts allow us to analyse the potential control mechanisms in greater detail. When 
examining the control mechanisms, we can then look for how the Member States established the 
mandate and rules as part of the delegation of authority. Fire-alarm and especially police-patrol 
oversight becomes relevant when looking for control mechanisms meant to control the EU during the 
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negotiations. How this affects the structure of the analysis is explained in the analytical strategy at the 
end of the chapter on methodology. 
3.3 How has PA been applied in EU studies? 
In this section we will zoom in on the theoretical insights created by applying the principal-agent theory to the 
EU in IOs. To gain insights that could contribute to the analysis we will compare and discuss texts from the 
literature review, which used PA theory to study the EU in IOs. The selected studies are from before as well as 
after the Lisbon Treaty and should therefore provide us with important insights when studying our chosen cases. 
The difference between this section and the literature review is that this section will focus entirely on the 
theoretical insights from the studies in order to determine if we can use some of these insights in our analysis. 
Principal-agent theory was originally developed with the US political system in mind (Billiet, 2009: 
435) it has been increasingly used in the studies of the EC/EU - Member States relationship in studies 
applying a rational choice institutional framework (Pollack 1997: 100). Damro (2007) is one the 
researchers, who applied the PA theory to study the EU. He did a comparative analysis of the EU’s 
participation in the International Competition Network (ICN) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) from 2001 to 2006, in order to evaluate the utility of PA in trade policy (Damro, 2007: 883). 
Damro sought to investigate who calls the shots for the EU in IOs and whether Member States or EU 
institutions are able to promote their interests in international negotiations (ibid). 
The policy areas trade and competition were chosen as both are policies where the Member States 
“have delegated considerable sovereignty to the supranational level” (ibid: 884) and he therefore 
expected the PA dynamics to be most evident in these policy fields (ibid). Competition policy is a 
regulatory policy and trade policy is a distributive policy and Damro anticipated PA theory to apply 
differently for the two policy areas (ibid: 888). It was expected that the principal is more likely to 
delegate authority in the area less likely to be politicised, which is competition policy (ibid: 889). 
The two cases were quite different. Where the treaties provide control mechanisms regarding trade, 
there are no similar mechanisms for competition because the Member States did not anticipate the 
scenario where competition policy would be negotiated internationally. The only control mechanism 
that arose as a result of the increase in external effects created by competition policy, was the 
restriction that binding agreements could not be signed (ibid: 898). 
The important difference in these findings is that PA theory seems less useful regarding trade 
(distributive) policy due to the effect of observational equivalence, whereas it is better suited to 
explain the development regarding competition (regulatory) policy, where the agent has more 
Page 29 of 96 
 
authority to ‘slack’ (ibid: 900). Furthermore, we can expect to find differences in the PA relationship 
depending on how politicised an issue is. This difference did show up in some of the interviews and 
we pursued the subjects in later interviews to gain further insight. 
 
Billiet (2009) also studied the PA theory’s applicability to trade policy, more specifically the 
Commission’s autonomy and influence in intellectual property rights disputes in the WTO (Billiet, 
2009: 435). Billiet investigated trade policy because it combines both internal and external issues, and 
also competences that are exclusive to the EU institutions and those that are not (ibid: 437). The study 
focused on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). 
Billiet expected the Commission to have a greater opportunity to ‘slack’ or shirk in cases with a high 
institutional setting. The strengthened institutional framework of the WTO enabled the Commission 
to be proactive in the TRIPS disputes and act outside the official mandate from the Member States 
(ibid: 450). 
Billiet therefore recommended that studies using PA theory to analyse the EU’s involvement in an 
external setting should incorporate the institutional framework of that setting, given the possibilities 
such a setting provides for the Commission to act autonomously (ibid: 451). It is, therefore, important 
that we examine how the institutional framework for the two cases shaped the EU’s opportunity to 
drift or shirk. As shown in the previous chapter, both cases had different phases. The MDG process 
consisted of UN conferences, DAC meetings, a UN summit, and the SDG process consisted of OWG 
sessions, with Member States in troikas, and a more traditional intergovernmental phase. 
 
Unlike the other two cases, which studied highly formalised/institutionalised settings, Niemann & 
Huigens (2011) studied EC/EU involvement in the informal and flexible G81 since the EU was granted 
authority to act on behalf of the Member States in 1977 (Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 420). The EC was 
represented by the Commission and the Council Presidency without replacing existing EC members 
in the G8, but a formal mandate was never given (Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 421). PA relationships 
usually involve a contract between the agent and the principal. However, it is not necessarily an 
explicit or legalised contract, which the EU involvement in the G8 is an example of (Niemann & 
Huigens, 2011: 421). 
                                                     
1 The study spans many years and the G8 has had other names in that period, but we will only use the name G8 
to avoid confusion 
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There were two oversight mechanisms in this case, that were mainly used by the countries in favour 
of EC participation in G8. The Commission had to report to the bodies of the Council on G8 aims and 
results and EC coordination was arranged on the Council meeting before a summit (Niemann & 
Huigens, 2011: 425). The European G8 members made sure they always had the Council Presidency 
when there was a summit and it was therefore not until 1982 that the Council was independently 
represented (ibid). Niemann and Huigens found that an increase in competences and a weakening of 
the control mechanisms made the Commission increasingly autonomous. The Commission’s 
competences changed over time, which meant it could involve itself in more of the issues in the G8. 
Additionally, as the preferences of the Member States changed, they became disinterested in using the 
control mechanisms, which became ceremonial and irrelevant (ibid:427) This change occurred because 
the EU G8 members came to appreciate the EU contributions and expertise at the summits. 
Furthermore, the non-G8 EU Member States learned that the summits did not rival or undermine the 
European Union and since the agreements were not legally binding, became less interested in 
controlling EU participation (ibid: 428). 
Unlike the case of the G8, where the agreements did not rival or undermine the EU and the Member 
States, therefore, became disinterested, the impact of the policies we examine has increased over time. 
The MDGs had very little official or expected impact on EU wide policies and were only used to guide 
the EU’s external development policy. Whereas, the SDGs are expected to affect both external EU 
policy and internal policy. This could lead to more control mechanisms limiting the EU’s ability to act 
autonomously. 
 
Nedergaard & Jensen (2014) analysed the coordination between the EU and its Member States at the 
UN, before and after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, using PA theory. They studied five different 
explanations in order to determine their explanatory factor. The five factors were: 1) the homogeneity 
of Member States’ preferences, 2) the nature of the issues, 3) the repartition of competences between 
agent and principal, 4) the nature of the agents, 5) IO rules and their effect on EU coordination. They 
found that the Commission got increasingly more room to manoeuvre after the Lisbon Treaty. This is 
interpreted as “a drift towards increasing actorness as well as exclusive competences given to the 
Commission” (ibid: 55). However, the UK worked towards keeping the power to control the 
Commission with the presidency (ibid: 55). This shows that despite some Member States’ resistance 
the Lisbon Treaty has led to more EU actorness. We should therefore expect to see more EU autonomy 
although they had to represent the Member States, not themselves. 
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3.4 Critique of Principal-Agent Theory 
We will in this section present some of the critiques raised against PA theory as well as the answers to these 
critical issues in order to gain insights into the vulnerabilities of the PA theory and be able to take these 
vulnerabilities into account when operationalising the theory. Pollack (2007) reviews the main critiques of PA 
theory when applied in international studies and finds that the critiques can be divided into three categories; one 
stemming from misinterpretations of PA theory, a theoretical critique and an empirical critique. We will in this 
section only examine the latter two categories as misinterpretations of the PA-theory does not invalidate the 
usefulness of the theory, but is rather a result of poor communication. 
Pollack (2007) presents a theoretical critique of PA with impetus in an article by Majone (2001), in 
which Majone states that one should make a distinction between agents and what he calls trustees. 
The difference between an agent and a trustee is that the principal has completely and irrevocably 
transferred their “political property rights” (Majone, 2001: 113, cited in Pollack, 2007) to a trustee in a 
policy area. In a traditional PA relationship political property rights are transferred temporarily so the 
idea of a complete and irrevocable transfer of rights questions the explanatory power of the theory in 
those cases. The existence of trustees is a empirical and theoretical debate, that will not be dealt with 
in this thesis, as our cases do not show any signs of a complete and irrevocable transfer of political 
property rights. This means Majone’s criticism will not be accommodated in our operationalisation of 
the theory, as this thesis is concerned with EU-Member States relations at the UN, where the Member 
States’ political property rights are relatively intact, as the EU Member States still have their 
independent voice and are able to vote as they like in the UN. 
 
Pollack (2007) also deals with the empirical critiques of PA theory. According to Pollack the critics 
argue that even though PA theory might be theoretically coherent and consistent internally, it fails to 
identify how and why states delegate powers to international agents and what kind of autonomy and 
influence these international agents have vis-á-vis their principals (Pollack, 2007: 13). The critics argue 
the PA hypothesis about delegation is impossible to test empirically or the attempts so far have been 
badly executed (ibid: 14). Pollack’s answer to the critique is that PA theory is not alone in having 
difficulties “measuring abstract theoretical concepts empirically” (ibid) and that these problems are 
also present in the field of constructivist research, from which most of the critics stem (ibid). This 
criticism will be accommodated in our choice of method. Doing a case study based on interviews 
enable us to identify how and why the Member States delegate, by enquiring Member State 
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representatives about their reasons for delegating. This means that these reasons for delegation will 
not be theoretical assumptions but reflected in the data. We will further elaborate on our methodology 
in the next chapter. 
 
Finnemore (1993) and others put forward that principals may delegate authority for other reasons 
than efficiency, for instance they might feel that the delegation of authority is considered appropriate 
(Pollack, 2007: 15-16). Pollack (2007) concedes that principals might delegate because it is appropriate, 
in as long as the cost of delegation is negligible. According to Pollack it is difficult to distinguish 
empirically if a delegation of authority is made because it is the most appropriate or the most efficient 
thing to do (Pollack, 2007: 14-16). We agree with Pollack that it is difficult to determine when social 
norms and ideas about appropriateness is part of the reasons for delegating to an agent. This is why 
we are asking Member State representatives about their motivations for coordinating with the EU. 
This should allow us to learn if the coordination in our cases only takes place for efficiency reason or if 
there are other factors at play. This is why efficiency and material gain will not be our only possible 
explanations when we investigate the motives of the principals and agents to be part of this process. 
We will also be open to immaterial motivations like status and social norms as our interviewees might 
indicate that these factors were also part of their motivation. 
 
A third empirical criticism of PA is that principals have other sources of power to influence agents, 
who also have their own idiosyncratic preferences and ways of influencing principals. PA critics such 
as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) claim that the agent (in this case an international institution) can have 
a moral authority, which makes that agent able to influence the principal. Pollack does not dismiss 
this critique and concedes that moral authority and persuasion might have marginal effects, and PA 
theorists should be aware of his possibility (Pollack, 2007: 16-20). We will, as with some of the 
previous mentioned critiques of PA theory, rely on our method to accommodate for this criticism. Our 
method will take moral authority into account, by allowing for the people involved in the process to 
explain the motivation for their actions, thus allowing us to discover if the moral authority of a 
principal or an agent have indeed been a motivation for action. 
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3.5 Critique of Rational Choice Theory 
The previous section delved into the critique of the principal-agent theory itself, but the framework upon which it 
is build should not be ignored and raise a variety of questions and problems which need answering. Principal-
agent theory is a rational choice theory and therefore uses some of the same assumptions in its framework. We 
will in this section review some of the critiques of rational choice theory in order to be able to adapt how we are 
operationalising the theory in our analysis in order to avoid or modify the most problematic elements of rational 
choice assumptions. 
Rational choice theory makes a number of assumptions in order to explain individual behaviour. 
There is disagreement regarding the assumptions of rational choice, but the assumptions which most 
scholars would agree upon are: “utility maximisation, the structure of preferences, decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty and the centrality of individuals in the explanation of collective 
outcomes” (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 13). A quick explanation of these basic assumptions is that actors 
maximise the utility of their actions, by picking the options they think will give them the greatest 
benefit (ibid: 14). However, what an actor values most is a widely debated issue in the rational choice 
literature (ibid: 18) and it is a discussion we avoid, as our goal in this thesis is to apply the theory to 
gain insight into the relationship between the EU and the Member States in the area of EU foreign 
policy and not to test a rational choice hypothesis.  
 
The “structure of preferences” assumption means that the actor must be able to determine which 
outcomes she prefer and to some extent rank possible outcomes in order to pursue the one that will 
produce the most preferable benefit (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 14). Those preferences are connected to 
the outcome, which is not necessarily known and actors therefore base their decision making on 
expected output in cases of uncertainty (ibid: 15). The idea that actors have perfect information is 
unrealistic (ibid: 19) and exactly the possession of information is an important aspect of a PA 
relationship (Pollack, 1997: 108). It is the information asymmetry that enables the agent to drift (Billiet, 
2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108), shirk (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61) or slip 
(Billet, 2009: 439) and therefore necessitates the creation of control mechanisms by the principal 
(Pollack, 1997: 108). This means that we will have to investigate what kind of information both the EU 
and the Member States possessed in the processes, as we cannot assume that they knew everything, 
when we are determining the agent’s moral hazard.  
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Another assumption is that actors are individuals, and it is maximising behaviour of individuals, 
which explain collective outcomes. This means the state is only a ‘machine’ that enable or foster 
cooperation between individuals and therefore cannot have its own preferences (Green & Shapiro, 
1994: 16). We disagree with the last notion that rational choice only applies to individuals and not 
institutions. As explained earlier in the chapter, one of the core features of a PA relationship is 
asymmetry in preferences (Miller, 2005: 205-206) and if the EU institutions can act as the agent in such 
a relationship, then it must have preferences in order for it to have different preferences than the 
principals. This means an institution can have preferences and pursue those preferences the same way 
as an individual can. 
Scharpf (2000) also argues that institutions matter. Institutions change the incentive structures for 
actors, thereby changing what kind of actions are in their interest (Scharpf, 2000: 770-771). You are 
able to detect the influence of institutions by developing numerous hypotheses of what kind of actions 
an actor would take in the institution if she was acting rationally and had full information. If these 
hypotheses are not confirmed, one has identified an area in which the actor’s actions are constrained 
by the institution as she does not do what is objectively in her self-interest (ibid: 783-785). This 
deviation in the definition of a rational actor should not affect the other assumptions regarding the 
behaviour of an actor and the rational choice theory as a whole. 
 
Perhaps the core assumption is that actors behave rationally and base their decisions on a cost-benefit 
analysis of the choices ahead (Scott, 2000: 136). However, this raises the issue of how actors react if 
they are unable to calculate the outcome of a decision or if they are uncertain of future risks. Exactly 
this problem of future risk or uncertainty could explain collective action, which is an issue rational 
choice struggles to explain. Collective action is a problematic issue for rational choice theory, which 
has no explanation for why actors join groups and associations (ibid), but it is exactly this problem 
that the principal-agent theory explains. If an individual can opt-out of collective action and pursue 
their own interest then it limits the incentive to participate in collective action (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 
14) especially if the individual can receive the benefit of the collective action without contributing 
(Oppenheimer, 2012: 28). If all individuals acted rationally and only focused on their own needs, then 
the collective action would not be achieved (ibid: 30). 
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The liberal intergovernmentalists would argue that the problems connected to collective action 
explain why individuals would agree to delegate authority to a supranational actor, who can then 
ensure all individuals uphold their end of the bargain (Kassim & Menon, 2003: 126). Other solutions to 
the collective action problem involve social motivations and ethics (Oppenheimer, 2012: 48), which 
entail that the individual receives a benefit that is hard to quantify in the case of a social setting or that 
the individual is bound by ethical concerns. One example of the impact of a social setting is that: “add 
a little ability to communicate among participants to a prisoner dilemma game, and bingo: One gets 
lots of cooperation” (ibid: 58). However, this does not make rational choice invalid, it merely 
complicates the way an individual determines her interests (ibid: 59). We therefore have to be aware 
that agents and principals might seek rewards, which are immaterial and thereby harder to quantify. 
3.7 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is not only to explore and discuss the different aspects of the Principal-
agent theory, but also to explain the theoretical aspects that are the most important in our research. It 
is important that we are aware of what we can expect to find using this theory and if there are any 
possible pitfalls to avoid. This is why we reviewed the critiques of PA-theory and rational choice 
theory. There should of course be reasons for the principals to delegate authority to the agent, but this 
delegation comes at a price and the principal therefore constructs control mechanisms to maintain 
some level of control while giving the agent room to act. These control mechanisms are especially 
important in cases where the agent have preferences that differ substantially from the interests of the 
principals or in cases where the principals have strong interests. Given previous studies we expect to 
find stronger control mechanisms or increased usage of the mechanisms on issues of distributive 
policy and weaker mechanisms in cases of regulatory policy. The control mechanisms available to the 
principals can be divided into two categories, ex-ante and ex-post. 
Observational equivalence is possibly the largest pitfall when studying the PA relationship. It is the 
situation where it is difficult to determine if an agent behaves exactly like the principal wants it to 
because it has the same interests or because the control mechanisms prevent it from doing something 
else. However, Damro (2007) believes this can be mitigated by using expert interviews (Damro, 2007: 
900). We have also found different behavioural patterns, drifting, shirking and slippage, which can 
describe agent behaviour that deviates from the behaviour desired by the principal. 
We have identified a couple of reasons for this behavioural deviation in the literature. In the case of 
the G8 the Commission influenced the preferences of the principals over time and they then stopped 
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using the control mechanisms, which became ceremonial. The EU can also take advantage of a highly 
informal setting, where its mandate is less restrictive (Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 429). 
We have identified some relevant critiques of PA-theory and rational choice assumptions that we will 
mitigate, by doing a case study based on interviews, which allow us to understand why Member 
States delegate. The assumptions for why principals delegate has been relaxed in a number of ways in 
order to include social norms and status. We have also relaxed the assumption that all actors have 
perfect information, which means that we will have to establish who knew what and when. 
  
Page 37 of 96 
 
4.0 Methods 
This chapter will focus on the methods we use to conduct our research and how we can effectively use the 
theoretical foundation, from the previous chapter, to analyse the EU-Member States relationship. First is our 
considerations on employing semi-structured interviews, which we use to gather most of the data used for the 
analysis. Next we consider the application of case studies, which we use in order to systematically analyse 
changes in the relationship. Following the two methodological tools we use is a section that explain how we 
maintain reliability, replicability and validity. At the end we explain our analytical strategy for the analysis and 
the discussion. 
4.1 Interview theme 
This subchapter contains an examination the qualitative interviews that provide the main empirical data used in 
the thesis. In the first section we will examine and clarify how the subject of the thesis translates into aims for 
the interviews. The next section will explain our reasoning for using semi-structured interviews, after which we 
will be explaining why we are employing an interview guide. There will also be a section with specific emphasis 
on the usage of different types of questions especially with regard to interviewing highly educated elites. 
In this section we will be expound on some of the preparation of conducting an interview. In the pre-
interview phase, it is important to thematise the study. This entails developing research questions and 
theoretical clarifications (Kvale, 2007: 37-38). Another step when thematising an interview, is 
clarifying what the purpose of the interview is. Qualitative research interviews can be conducted for 
many purposes. Some use them to gain knowledge of a social situation or a life story, and others use 
qualitative interviews to develop and test hypotheses (Kvale, 2007: 38). We presented our research 
question in chapter one and our theoretical clarifications in chapter three. The aim of the interviews 
will be to (A) obtain knowledge about the EU Commission and its Member States, in the process of 
formulating the MDGs and the SDGs, in order to (B) assess how the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s 
changed status at the UNGA have changed the relationship. We use the concepts of control mechanisms 
(Billiet, 2009: 440, Damro, 2007: 889, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 438, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) and moral 
hazards (Eisenhart, 1987: 61, Miller, 2005: 205) from PA theory to analyse the EU-Member State 
relationship, by examining ex-ante (Pollack, 1997: 108) and ex-post (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & 
Huigens, 2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) control mechanisms and the EU’s possibility to drift (Billiet, 
2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108), shirk (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61), and slip 
(Billet, 2009: 439). This is very similar to hypothesis testing, as the PA theory offers hypotheses on how 
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the principal and the actors can act and what the outcome of these actions will be. When investigating 
this relationship between the Member States and the EU through the interviews, we will at the same 
time test the hypotheses from PA theory. Interviews used for hypothesis testing are often more 
structured, and use a standardized wording and a standardized sequence of questions in order to 
compare the answers (Kvale 2007: 38). In order to gain some of that structure into our interviews we 
have, therefore, developed an interview guide (Appendix 1) for both cases to ensure we ask the same 
questions in each case. 
4.1.1 The semi-structured interview 
We will use semi-structured interviews for our thesis, because it offers an open, yet structured form. 
The form will allow us to adapt our questions to the responses that the interviewee gives, prompting 
the interviewee to give more precise answers as well as offering us a quite structured approach, which 
will ensure we cover all the relevant themes. The aim of a semi-structured interview is to obtain 
insights into the perspective of the interviewee, regarding the meaning of a phenomenon. A semi-
structured interview has several areas of interest to be covered during the interview as well as 
suggested questions. The interview guide should, however, also be open to changes in the order and 
wording of the questions in order to be able to follow up on the interviewee’s answers (Kvale, 2007: 
51). The interview is therefore divided into four themes consisting of questions covering the 1.) the 
interviewee’s background, 2.) policy goals, 3.) EU Commission and the MDGs/SDGs, 4.) control 
mechanisms. Some of the questions also have follow-up questions that could become relevant 
depending on the interviewee’s answers, but there is also room to follow relevant unsuspected issues 
mentioned by the interviewee. When conducting the interviews we will set the stage for the interview 
at the beginning, by briefing the interviewee about the purpose of the interview and allow the 
interviewee to ask questions before starting the interview. The interviewee will also at the end of the 
interview get the opportunity to ask questions and clarify answers in order to give the interviewee an 
opportunity to correct or expand on an answer given during the interview. 
 
As mentioned previously, we will be using an interview guide to structure the interviews. The 
interview guide consists of two columns and several sections. The first column contains the questions, 
while the second column contains the kind of knowledge we seek to obtain by asking the question. 
This outline of questions and desired pieces of information ensures that we cover all the relevant 
themes and asks all the relevant question. The outline also lets us know which questions and themes 
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are the most central to the thesis which makes it easier for us to prioritize these question, if we should 
run out of time. This structured outline of the interview guide makes sure that we will ask the same 
theory derived question of the interviewees, thereby making their answers more comparable. 
 
As noted earlier, we have interviewed elite persons for the thesis, which pose advantages and 
disadvantages that Kvale’s (2007) method does not account for. This is particularly relevant for the 
type of questions that can be used for an interview; open and close-ended questions. It is important 
when we decide, which kind of questions should be asked in an interview that we take into account 
how much we already know. Close-ended questions are preferable if you have previously studied the 
field extensively or already have a lot of information from other kinds of sources or previous 
interviews. Using closed-ended questions makes it easier to make “an elegant analytical product” 
(Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 674) especially if you are using statistical analysis. However, we will 
employ open-ended questions when we conduct the interviews for this thesis, because all of our 
interviewees will be highly educated elites, who will not respond well to closed-ended questions. 
Highly educated people and elites do not like “being put in the straightjacket of closed-ended 
questions” (ibid). 
Instead they would like to be able to explain how and why they act and think the way they do. 
Closed-ended questions also have the drawback that they sometime inspire counter question to the 
framing of a question or its response categories (ibid). Open-ended questions help maximise validity. 
This is because open-ended questions give the respondents the possibility to “organize their answers 
within their own framework” (ibid). Using open-ended questions is best for doing in-depth and 
explorative work, but also makes the coding and analysis more difficult. We are, however, in 
agreement with Aberbach and Rockman that doing the interviews in “the most reliable way is more 
valuable than an analytical rigorous treatment of less reliable and informative data” (ibid). We 
therefore mainly use open-ended questions to collect the best data possible. 
 
Having the advantages and disadvantages in mind we can expand on the different kinds of questions 
we will use and what situations they will be appropriate for. We will be employing a variety of 
different types of questions in order to cover all aspects of the interview theme and in order to secure 
as rich information as possible. When starting the interview, and when moving from one interview 
theme to another, an open question will be asked. An open question may prompt the interviewee to 
give “spontaneous, rich descriptions where the subjects themselves provide what they experience as 
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the main aspects of the phenomenon investigated.” (Kvale, 2007: 60). This could for instance be asking 
the interviewee how they got involved in the MDGs or SDGs: “So just to begin with could you briefly 
outline how you got involved in the SDG process” (Interview C, l 3). Our first open question will 
usually be followed by a follow-up- or a probing question in order to get the interviewee to elaborate 
on the issue raised in their answer: 
 
“so the negotiations could change in unanticipated ways during these negotiations because you 
couldn't plan for everything so the did the commission ever our stray off let's say the year the agreed 
path when something new came up the they take a position you didn't agree with or that other 
members that agree with?” (Interview C, l 253-256). 
 
If the interviewee in her answer touch upon something central, we will ask a specifying question or 
interpreting question in order to get a more detailed and specific answer of how the interviewee 
interpreted the situation. This could for instance be when the interviewee touch upon something that 
could be interpreted as a control mechanism. Here it would be relevant to ask both a specifying 
question about the nature of the control mechanism and an interpreting question about how the 
interviewee interpreted the effect of that control mechanism: “but you would be able to you and other 
members were able to make them correct the mistake sort of immediately?” (Interview C, l 329-330). 
When a follow-up or probing question fails to deliver a desired piece of information, we will ask a 
direct question regarding the desired piece of information. This could for example be asking more 
directly if there were any control mechanisms in place. We will be using indirect questions when we 
feel that asking a direct question might insult or bring the interviewee in a defensive position. This is 
done in order to make sure the interviewee is not offended. Structured question will be used to make 
sure that we cover all the themes in our interview guide within the time set aside for the interview. As 
mentioned above we interview elites that have limited time and they sometimes have what Kvale calls 
“talking tracks” where they have a certain point or story they try to promote in the interview (Kvale, 
2007: 70). In this case a structuring question might be in order, which could begin with: “going back to 
the informal meetings you said they were part of…” (Interview C, l 506). 
4.1.2 The interviewees 
We have conducted 8 oral semi-structured interviews (Appendix 3, Interview A-H) and one written 
interview via e-mail (Y) with people directly involved in either the MDG or the SDG process. 
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Interview H was cut short, but we sent some follow-up questions by e-mail, which the interviewee 
answered and it has been put in the bottom of the transcribed interview. The interviewees who 
supplied the interview data for the thesis are anonymous. However, we will elaborate on the kind of 
people we interviewed. Our interviewees are “elite” diplomats and can be divided into two groups, 
Member State representatives and EU officials. We have only interviewed Member State 
representatives from the northern European countries, which could mean some aspects of the EU-
Member States relationship are unexplored. Nonetheless, we do not expect those representatives to 
have particularly different views on EU participation in IOs. Our interviews focus on factual aspects 
of the EU-Member States relationship and how the EU’s actions aligned with the given mandate. We 
will, however, ask if they think their interpretation of the events are shared by the other Member State 
representatives. Through the interviews we did uncover differences regarding the interests of the 
Member States and what this meant for the EU’s role in the negotiations. This indicates the types of 
questions asked allowed us to discover the central differences between the Member States. 
4.1.3 Interview Form 
Knowing the kinds of questions, we will ask, and when to ask them, we can now clarify the form of 
our interviews. Our interviews consist of a mixture of the factual and conceptual forms. In factual 
interviews the focus is on “Obtaining valid factual information” (Kvale, 2007: 71) for example when 
we ask “What would you say was the main goals for the commission in the SGD process in policy 
wise content of the the goals?” (Interview A, l 67-68). In a conceptual interview the main goal is to 
obtain a conceptual clarification from the interviewee (Kvale, 2007: 71) for example when we ask “did 
it surprise you in any way, how the commission acted in this process? did any of its actions statement 
or initiatives surprise you in any way?” (Interview B, l 263-264). Our interviews will mainly have a 
factual form as we aim at discovering the nature of the relationship between the Member States and 
the EU in the development of the MDGs and SDGs. In order to do that, we need to establish facts 
about that relationship, which are not present in the documents produced in developing these goals, 
this could for instance be which control mechanisms were in place and how they were used. However, 
we also need to obtain knowledge about how the actors interpreted different aspects of these facts, 
such as how they interpreted the effects of the control mechanisms in place. In order to obtain this 
kind of knowledge we have to ask conceptual questions on for example the control mechanisms in 
place or how they interpreted actions by other actors. Obtaining knowledge about how the different 
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actors interpreted each other's actions is important for our analysis, as triangulation of the data will 
increase validity. 
4.1.4 Quality control of the interviews 
Quality control is important for the analysis, verification and reporting of the interviews (Kvale, 2007: 
80) and we, therefore, examine some of the criteria applicable to qualitative interviews and how we 
design our interviews to fulfil these criteria. 
 
In order to accommodate Kvale’s six quality criteria we will, as explained previously, start the 
discussion of every theme in the interviews by asking an open question. If the question is well 
phrased it should prompt “spontaneous, rich, specific and relevant answers” (ibid). Accommodating 
the second criteria of short questions and long answers (ibid) again comes down to the phrasing of the 
question. We will strive to construct short questions that prompt detailed answers. We will seek to 
accommodate the third criterion of clarification (ibid) by asking specifying and follow-up questions 
during the interview, when the interviewee talks about a central theme for this thesis. This could for 
instance be the effect of a control mechanism. We will strive to accommodate the fourth and fifth 
criterion regarding interpretation (ibid), by asking interpretive follow-up questions, thereby making 
sure that the interview is interpreted while it takes place. The sixth criteria (ibid) will be 
accommodated by sticking to the themes in our interview guide, and only moving on from one theme 
to another, when the topic has been adequately covered. This should make the interview more of a 
story that progresses rather than a conversation that quickly and often jumps between themes (Ibid). It 
occurred that the interviewees answered several of our questions or directed the conversation onto 
themes, which were planned for later in the interview and in these cases we redirected the 
conversation to earlier themes that were not fully explored. For example, we asked one interviewee: 
“you talk about that you maintain the coordination between the member states would you say that 
was on the EU's initiative or was of the member states who were still wanting to coordinate even 
though it was more a loosely...” (Interview E, l 174-176) when we had not got the desired piece of 
information from the previous answers. 
4.2 Case Studies 
This subchapter presents our considerations regarding the use of case studies. We present a definition of case 
studies, our reasons for using case studies by discussing the advantages and disadvantages in doing case studies. 
We then present our arguments for selecting the MDG and SDG processes as cases. 
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As mentioned earlier, the analysis in the thesis is focused on two cases, the MDG and the SDG. For the 
purpose of this study we will be using George and Bennett's (2005) definition of a case. They define a 
case as “an instance of a class of events” (George & Bennett, 2005: 17-19). The term class of events 
refers to the phenomenon that has the researcher’s interest, which for instance could be revolutions, 
government regimes or, as in our case, the agreements on the MDGs and SDGs. 
When selecting a case you have to specify what the episodes that you have selected to study are a 
class of event of (ibid). The episodes in our thesis are the meetings in international organisations and 
intergovernmental negotiations that led to the agreements on the MDGs and SDGs. The class of events 
this thesis is aimed at studying is the relationship between the EU and the EU Member States with a 
focus on the changes in this relationship between the two agreements. 
 
George and Bennett (2005) define case studies to include both “within-case analysis of single cases and 
comparisons of a small number of cases” (ibid). This is because there is a growing consensus that 
using both within-case analysis in a single case as well as cross-case comparison is fruitful for theory 
testing and development (ibid). We agree with George and Bennett and we, therefore, use the label 
case study even though our study also could be described as a comparison study with a small number 
of cases (ibid). So even though we analyse differences between two cases and therefore make a 
comparison, it qualifies as a case study according to the definition proposed by George & Bennett 
(2005). 
 
We conduct a structured focused comparison case study. We structure our study by asking the same 
theory derived general questions to both cases in an effort to make it easier to compare them (George 
& Bennett, 2005: 67). We focus our study by only including the relevant parts from the two cases we 
are examining in order to exclude the parts of the cases that do not represent the phenomenon we are 
studying (ibid: 68). Thus we will only analyse events that can tell us something about the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States in terms of the control mechanisms ex-ante (Pollack, 1997: 108) 
and ex-post (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) and the moral 
hazards drifting (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108), shirking (Damro, 2007: 886, 
Eisenhart, 1987: 61), and slippage (Billet, 2009: 439). 
Our case study will be a controlled comparison case study. This means that we will be investigating 
two cases. One before the enactment of the Lisbon treaty (Our independent variable) and one after the 
Page 44 of 96 
 
enactment of the treaty. The case study is controlled in the sense that we are seeking to keep all other 
variable constant. We will discuss our selection of cases later in the chapter. 
4.2.1 Advantages of case studies 
We have chosen to do a case study because it offers advantages in terms of validity. The use of case 
studies allows us to obtain a great degree of conceptual validity and to identify and measure the 
indicators which correspond with the theoretical concepts that we intend to measure (Bryman, 
2012:74). This is because a lot of the phenomena that social scientists are interested in, such as 
democracy or power, are very difficult to measure and quantify. In statistical studies there is a risk of 
concept stretching if dissimilar cases are lumped together in order to reach an acceptable sample size. 
Case studies on the other hand allow for greater validity over a small number of cases as you do not 
have to lump dissimilar cases together (George and Bennett, 2005: 19). It is for this reason that we have 
selected two cases that are both UN development policies. 
 
Case studies allow for the discovery of new variables and hypotheses, which is another reason why 
we chose a case study. By interviewing people instead of sending them a questionnaire you open up 
for the interviewee bringing up new variables or hypotheses that we, as researchers, had not thought 
of. If we ask an interviewee what she thought of control mechanism A, B and C and she answered that 
these control mechanisms were not that significant but control mechanism Z was very significant, we 
have discovered a variable that we would not have discovered using statistical methods. Using only 
statistical methods we would have no way of knowing if there are other variables at play than the 
ones that are part of the dataset (George and Bennett, 2005: 20-23). This is another reason for using 
semi-structured interviews, which allow us to direct the interviews in the direction of the subjects and 
factors we investigate, while allowing for the interviewees to answer in depth and thereby potentially 
unearthing unexpected factors. 
 
Another advantage of using case studies is that we can take the context of the cases we are studying 
into account when determining under which conditions the causal mechanism is active (Bryman, 
2012:74). This ability to take the context into account is very important for our study because the cases 
we compare are more than 10 years apart and the series of events that constitute these cases have been 
very different. This means that identifying the effect of the context on the causal mechanism we are 
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trying to discover is very important. This as well as other general issues resulting from the time span 
between the cases is discussed later in the chapter. 
4.2.2 Common critiques 
A common challenge for case studies is that they are good at determining whether and how 
something mattered but have problems determining how much it matters (George & Bennett, 2005: 
25). However, this challenge is less important in our research design of this thesis, as we want to 
discover, whether and how the Lisbon Treaty and the UN mandate change had an effect on the 
relationship between the EU and the Member States and not how much it mattered compared to other 
factors. 
We will have to touch upon another common criticism of case studies because of our chosen research 
design: Case studies are not representative of diverse population and they should, therefore, not make 
claims that findings can be transferred beyond the narrow confinements of the studied case (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 30-32). This criticism would be absolutely relevant if the aim of this thesis was to 
confirm a grand hypothesis in all aspects of foreign policy about the relationship between the 
Commission and the Member States. This is however not the ambition of this thesis. Instead, the 
ambition is to gain insight on the development of the relationship over time between the EU and the 
Member States when it comes to acting in the UNGA. It is on this basis that the processes and 
negotiation leading to the agreement on the MDGs and SDG are strong case choices. The policy arena 
(the UN) and the policy issues (development) are similar in both case, the main variance between the 
cases is the EU’s institutional position at the UN and the process that developed the goals. 
4.2.3 Case Selection 
The selection of cases is one of the choices in our research design that will affect the analysis in the 
thesis the most. In this section we will present our reasons for selecting the processes leading to the 
agreements on the MDGs and the SDGs. According to George & Bennett (2005) the decision to study a 
case should be based on the fact that the case is relevant to the research objectives (George & Bennett 
(2005: 83). Below we will argue, for why the cases selected are particularly relevant for our research 
objective. 
We have selected cases that would qualify as before and after cases. The events that separates the 
MDG and the SDG cases into before and after cases are the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty December 
1st 2009 (and the change of the EU’s mandate at the UN in 2011). The MDG process ended in 2001 
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eight years before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 and the SDG process began in 2012, 
three years after the Lisbon Treaty and one year after the 2011 UN mandate change. This longitudinal 
element provides us with a useful method to study changes in the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States, since we can analyse the same policy subject at different points in time (Bryman, 
2012:72). Furthermore, we want to keep as many variables constant as possible. This meant we picked 
cases with similar policy focus and policy arena, in order to conduct a controlled case comparison. The 
MDG and SDG cases were chosen because they were both discussed (and voted on) in the UNGA, 
which holds the policy arena constant. The issues dealt with, in both the MDGs and the SDGs, are 
developmental issues, holding the policy issues somewhat constant, although there is a greater 
environmental focus in the SDGs compared to the MDGs. 
The cases selected cannot be classified as most likely cases. The MDG process was very unstructured 
and many actors were not intentionally working towards creating development goals in the beginning 
of the process (Hulme & Scott, 2007). For the SDG process the Member States were organised in 
troikas with other countries sharing a seat in the OWG, which is quite unusual in the UN. These 
unusual circumstances mean that we will not qualify our cases as most-likely cases, but rather place 
them somewhere in the middle of continuum between most and least likely. This is because there are 
other cases where EU-Member States coordination is more unlikely, for example the issue of going to 
war. 
Another reason for selecting the two cases was the chance of finding factors that reflect the EU-
Member States relationship during the processes. By looking at previous studies in the literature review 
we found that the explanatory power of PA theory varied across policy areas (Damro, 2007). We 
therefore selected two cases that dealt with many policy areas (development, trade and environmental 
issues) in order to be able to avoid the possible bias when applying PA theory to a case dealing with 
just one policy field. This is important because we want to analyse the EU-Member States relationship 
in relation to the UN generally, otherwise we should have picked a policy specific case. 
The first class of events that led to the agreement on the MDGs allow us to learn the nature of the 
relationship between the EU Commission and the Member States in negotiations in IOs prior to the 
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. This case is relevant because we expect both the EU and the Member 
States to be relevant in these negotiations, which allow us to map out the relationship between them. 
The second class of events that led to the agreement on the SDGs also allow us to learn the nature of 
the relationship between the EU and the Member States, as they were involved in the process. The 
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SDG process took place after the Lisbon Treaty was enacted and the UN mandate expanded. 
Analysing the SDG process, therefore, enable us to examine the consequences for the EU-Member 
States relationship. 
4.2.4 Time perspective 
As mentioned we want to analyse a change in the relationship between the EU and the EU Member 
States and we have therefore picked cases before and after the Lisbon Treaty and the UN mandate 
change. The result is that we have selected cases with about 15 years between them, which raises a 
couple of issues for the data collection and the analysis. 
Process-tracing can be applied as a tool to make up for the shortcomings of a controlled comparison. 
When it is impossible to find cases that meet the basic requirement of controlled comparisons (cases 
similar in every respect but one) process-tracing can be used to identify the effect of different 
variables, both as part of the investigated causal mechanism as well as others that affect the result of 
the analysis (George & Bennett, 2005: 205-232). The circumstances and the context in which the 
processes took place have of course changed from the 1990s to 2015. The circumstances and the 
context could for instance be the amount of media coverage, the international focus on development 
as well as changes in international relations between countries. It is therefore not possible to keep all 
variables constant. Applying process tracing allows us to uncover how variables, other than the 
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty and the change of the EU’s mandate at the UN, might have affected 
this relationship. We will highlight when contextual factors seem to be at play, in order to determine 
how these factors have affected the relationship between the EU and the Member States. The first part 
of the analysis presents the empirical findings and relate the findings to the PA theory, whereas the 
second part of the analysis examines the differences and changes from the MDG case to the SDG case 
combined with insights from PA theory. The discussion then considers the findings from the analysis 
in relation to the insights from the literature review. 
The time perspective also influences our interviews, especially in the MDG case. It can make it more 
difficult for us to find the people involved in the processes, but this does not necessarily have an effect 
on the finished thesis. However, more importantly, the interviewees might remember the events 
differently now. They may have forgotten something that could be important or their recollection of 
the events could be distorted by later events irrelevant to us. However, this can be somewhat rectified 
by leaning on academic sources and documents generated during the two processes, which will be 
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elaborated in the next section. The first issue could make it more difficult for us in getting in contact 
with the people we want to interview, whereas the second issue makes it more important for us to 
have the interviewees confirm statements raised in previous interviews. 
4.3 Reliability, replicability and validity 
We have previously touched upon issues of validity and reliability, and we will now discuss them in more detail 
in order to explain how we will deal with these issues throughout the thesis. 
Internal validity is whether the results are accurate and basically whether we investigate what we 
want to investigate and we get results that are useful (Bryman, 2012:47). It is therefore vital that we 
ensure the results are valid and we do this by making sure our methods (semi-structured interview 
and case comparison) measure what we want it to (the relationship between the EU and its Member 
States) (Bryman, 2012:47). The questions in the interview guides are therefore linked to the concepts in 
PA theory and we make sure to explain our reasoning in the analysis. 
The results we can achieve rely on who we interview and it is for this reason we interview multiple 
people so we can compare the answers they give and avoid relying on single sources for the 
conclusions we make. 
Given this thesis’ focus on case study and qualitative interviews external validity (Bryman, 2012:47-48) 
is not the primary concern, but we will relate our findings to existing literature and previous studies 
to see how our results contribute to the study of the EU in IOs. However, our main objective is to 
make sure this thesis’ results are accurate and useful and not that the results can be used to make 
general predictions of the EU’s involvement in the UN or other IOs. 
 
Reliability is whether the method is reliable and replicable, meaning that the same method used 
repeatedly will produce the same results and another researcher can use the same method to get the 
same results (Bryman, 2012:46-47,390). Although low replicability is not uncommon in social research 
(ibid:47) we make the thesis as replicable as possible, by giving the sources for insights gathered 
elsewhere, in case someone else wants to test our research or conduct their own. 
The interview guide is essential to maintain reliability as it allows others to use the same method we 
have used, to try and replicate our results. However, considering our research is focused on two cases 
and is based on interviews, the researcher would have to ask the exact same questions to achieve the 
same results and the researcher would also have to interpret the answers the same way we have. 
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One issue regarding the transparency of our interviews is that we have chosen to make the list of 
interviewees anonymous, though the thesis examiners will receive the open list for their review. 
Keeping the interviewees anonymous was a choice we made because we are interviewing elite 
persons involved in diplomacy. We are studying a negotiation situation where the interactions, 
positions, and goals which have been discussed are kept secret and not revealed to outsiders in order 
to hide who ‘won’ and ‘lost’. Furthermore, being anonymous allowed them to answer our questions 
candidly and not worry that their answers would have an effect on their reputation and future career. 
Keeping the interviewees anonymous thereby provide us with better data. Although using sources 
that would not insist on being anonymous, would have increased the replicability of the thesis, there 
would have been a trade off in terms of data quality. It would have been almost impossible to get the 
central actors in the processes to participate in interviews, and their answers to questions on for 
example how they viewed other actors, would not have been straightforward, as they would risk 
other actors reading what they had said and potentially be offended by their answers. 
 
It is unlikely that another researcher can replicate our research, given the emphasis on qualitative 
interviews (with anonymous sources) as the main source of empirical data, but this is why it is 
important that we use the most thorough argumentation possible, so another researcher can replicate 
our analysis, if not our data collection. Relying on anonymous sources also makes the transparency of 
the other sources in the thesis important, as this will be one of the ways the reader can check a piece of 
information or an argumentation. We will be citing academic sources as well as documents generated 
in the MDG and SDG processes throughout the thesis. This should make it possible for the reader to 
investigate the foundation for the thesis’ conclusion. The interviews are also transcribed and put in 
Appendix 3, so the examiners can interpret the data themselves and the fact they are transcribed does 
not change analytical results (Bryman, 2012:398). We have been as transparent as possible, given the 
thesis’ focus on intergovernmental negotiations. 
4.3.1 Other Sources 
Our analysis will be based on a variety of sources. The information gained through the interviews will 
be the most prominent, but will not stand alone. Beside the interviews, we will use official 
Commission documents to gain an insight into which kind mandate the Commission had when 
negotiating the MDGs and the SDGs. We will also use documents drafted in the Open Working Group 
and the intergovernmental negotiation in the UN in order to support the information we gain through 
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the interviews and to nuance the analysis. These documents can also prove useful if the information 
we get from one interview is at odds with information we already got from another interview. In that 
case the documents might help in determining what happened. 
4.4 Analytical strategy 
This chapter has raised many relevant methodological issues and presented multiple tools that enable us to 
answer our research question. We now have both the theoretical knowledge and the method in place and we will 
now briefly summarise how the two are combined to form our analytical strategy. 
4.4.1 Operationalizing the theoretical concepts as analytical indicators 
In the theory chapter we defined and discussed the theoretical concepts that will be applied in the 
analysis. Previously in this chapter we explained that we conduct a structured and focused controlled 
case comparison study. This entails asking the same theoretically derived questions of our two cases. 
We will now discuss how we will operationalize these questions using indicators developed from the 
theoretical concepts in the way prescribed in the structured and focused controlled case comparison 
approach to study the relationship between the EU and the Member States. Table 1 on the following 
page visualise how we answer our research question and how the different parts of the analysis are 
linked. 
 
The first set of indicators we will use to assess the relationship between the EU and the Member States 
are the control mechanisms available to the Member States. We have derived two types of control 
mechanisms from the theory: ex-ante and ex-post. The ex-ante control mechanism will be centred 
around establishing the EU’s rights and mandate at the UN, to establish their formal role and 
involvement. The ex-post control mechanism that will be used as an indicator consists of the oversight 
procedures and the sanctioning capabilities available to the Member States. 
 
The second set of indicators, used to assess the relationship, will be the moral hazards that the EU 
experienced. The theoretical concepts of shirking and drifting will be used to assess if the EU did more 
or less, in the processes of developing the MDGs and SDGs, than the Member States wanted. We will 
assess all instances of shirking or drifting to determine if this is a result of slippage. Using these 
theoretical concepts from the PA-theory will allow us to identify and understand key elements in the 
relationship between the Member States and the EU. 
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Question Theory/Key concepts Data 
How was the EU 
involved in the 
creation of the 
Millennium 
Development Goals 
and what determined 
that involvement? 
 
Ex ante control mechanisms are the precautions 
the principal takes to limit the negative effects 
from delegation (Pollack, 1997: 108-109) 
 
Ex post control mechanisms are the tools that let 
the principal interfere in the workings of the 
agent (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 
2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) 
 
Shirking happens if the agent does not put in the 
effort that the principal expects of it (Damro, 
2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61) 
 
Drifting: happens if the agent acts in a way that is 
more in accordance with its own interests rather 
than its principals (Eisenhart, 1987: 61) to the 
detriment of the principal (Billiet, 2009: 439, 
Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108). 
Interviews with Member State 
representatives involved in the 
process of developing and 
negotiating the MDGs 
 
Interviews with people who 
worked in the Commission 
that was involved in the 
process of developing and 
negotiating the MDGs 
How was the EU 
involved in the 
creation of the 
Sustainable 
Development Goals 
and what determined 
that involvement? 
 
The same theoretical concepts as above will be 
applied in this section 
Interviews with Member State 
representatives involved in the 
process of developing and 
negotiating the SDGs 
 
Interviews with people who 
worked in the for the EU 
institutions that were involved 
in the process of developing 
and negotiating the SDGs 
How and why has the 
EU involvement in 
developing the 
agreements changed? 
 
The same theoretical concepts as above will be 
applied in this section 
The insight from the first two 
analytical question will be 
compared in order to 
determine, if, how and why 
EU involvement in the two 
processes differ 
 
As shown in Table 1 our approach to answer analytical question one and two are identical. This, as 
mentioned previously in this chapter, is because we aim to do a controlled comparison case study to 
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compare the MDG and SDG cases and therefore need to analyse them identically. This entails asking 
the same kind of question to each case and use the same type of data to answer these questions. In 
working question one and two we will be drawing on theoretical concepts from PA theory such as 
control mechanisms, shirking and drifting. We interviewed people directly involved in the two 
processes in order to determine what kind of control mechanisms were established and if any drifting 
or shirking took place. We interviewed both civil servants in the Commission and the EEAS as well as 
officials who represented the Member States in the two processes. In the third analytical question we 
do the controlled comparison of the cases in order to discover in what respects the relationship 
between the EU and the Member States were similar and in what respects they differed. 
 
Working Questions 
We have developed some working questions that will enable us to answer the research question as 
well as develop a coherent structure throughout this thesis. The questions are made on the basis of 
table 1 and further develop the structure of the analysis. Question 1 is for the MDG case and question 
2 is for the SDG case. Each have the same four sub-questions with question a) examining the formal 
role and involvement of the EU, b) control mechanisms, c) moral hazards. The third question is the 
comparison of the cases. 
 
1. How was the EU-Member States relationship in the creation of the Millennium Development 
Goals and what determined that relationship? 
a. How did the EU and the Council agree on a common EU position? 
b. What control mechanisms did the Member States have in place to ensure that the EU 
acted in accordance with its mandate? 
c. Which possibilities did the EU have to act beyond the mandate and did it act within it? 
2. How was the EU-Member States relationship in the creation of the Sustainable Development 
Goals and what determined that relationship? 
a. How did the EU and the Council agree on a common EU position? 
b. What control mechanisms did the Member States have in place to ensure that the EU 
acted in accordance with its mandate? 
c. Which possibilities did the EU have to act beyond its mandate and did it act within it? 
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3. How and why is the EU-Member States relationship different when developing the MDG and 
the SDG agreements? 
a. What were the differences in the process in terms of involvement, control mechanisms 
and moral hazards?  
b. How do these findings correspond with our theoretical preconceptions? 
c. What were the factors to the EU-Member States relationship that could not be 
explained by the theoretical framework? 
4. How do our analytical findings relate to previous studies that examined the EU in IOs? 
 
As a result of these working questions, the analysis has been divided into two parts. The first part 
consists of questions 1 and 2 and examines each case separately. Part two of the analysis is question 3 
and consists of a comparison of the two questions with contribution from the insights gained in the 
section on PA in EU-studies in the theory chapter. 
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5. Analysis part 1 
In the chapter on theory we described how and why we would operationalise theoretical insights from the 
principal-agent theory to study the MDG and the SDG processes. In the methods chapter we presented how and 
why we conduct a structured, focused controlled case comparison. It is on the basis of these choices that this 
chapter will investigate the role and interaction between the EU Member States and the EU institutions during 
the processes. The MDG process will be investigated in the first part of the chapter. The SDG process will be 
investigated in the second part of the chapter focusing on the relationship between the EU institutions and the 
Member States in that process. 
5.1 MDG 
In this subchapter we will investigate the relationship between the EU institutions and the Member States in the 
MDG process. We will establish the EU institutions’ role in the negotiations of the goals, as well as which 
control mechanisms were available to the Member States if the Commission drifted, shirked or slipped in the 
negotiations. 
5.1.1 Formal role and involvement 
The Commission had a limited formal role in the MDG process and was not very much involved 
(Interviews: F, l 6-22, Y, l, 37-44). DG DEVCO, which would have been the DG most likely to be 
involved, was disorganised and without a driving vision until the early 2000s (Interviews Y, l 84-87, F, 
l 154-167) and the top Commission officials, therefore, had the attitude that it should not involve itself 
in external affairs until its own “house was in order” (Interview F, l 332-334). According to one 
Commission representative the Commission would have liked to be involved if it could (Interview F, l 
154-167), but it would have lost trust if it tried to get involved without solving its internal problems 
first, and the first priority was therefore to fix their own problems and regain the confidence of the 
Member States (Interview F, l 132-147). Furthermore, the Member States did not make a request to 
involve the Commission (Interview F, l 332-334), questioning their willingness to have an agent in the 
first place. It seems the Commission as well as the Member States viewed the MDGs with a fair bit of 
scepticism, they were not sure if the unbinding goals would have any effect (Interview Y, l 74-81), 
which further limited the reason for involving the Commission. 
 
In a previous chapter on the MDG process we discussed the fragmented process in which the MDG 
goals were developed. The roots of the process were the UN conferences in the 90s and the OECD 
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DAC’s creation of the Groupe de réflexion also in the 90s (Hulme & Scott, 2007), which were both before 
the Commission had restructured DG DEVCO, and they were, therefore, ill-equipped to participate, 
even if they had wanted to. Our interviews show that the process was mainly driven by the donor 
countries (Interview Y, l 37-44) and DESA (Department of Social and Economic Affairs) in the UN 
(Interview Y, l 37-44), as well as Kofi Annan and Mark Malloch-Brown who were the driving forces in 
the UN process (Interview G, l 18-29). Because the substance of the policies had already been 
negotiated and agreed upon at the UN conferences, the amount of negotiation necessary was reduced 
and it allowed Kofi Annan and Mark Malloch-Brown to rather quickly make the countries agree on 
the Millennium Declaration (Interviews: Y, l 37-44, G, l 18-29). 
 
The Commission, at the time, had a distant relationship to the UN (Interview Y, l 51-61) and was not 
part of the General Assembly or the committees, but It could vary from one policy area to another 
(Interview Y, l 148-153). The Commission would facilitate coordination meetings in New York for the 
EU Member States. These meetings were formally led by the EU Presidency and not the Commission, 
although the Commission would sometimes provide papers that worked as the foundation for the 
discussions (Interview Y, l 148-153). Even though the Commission facilitated the coordination 
meetings with the Member States the MDGs were not discussed in detail, and the Commission was 
not directly involved in the development of the MDGs (Interview Y, l64-66). Furthermore, the EU 
Member States, perhaps unconsciously, acted more like UN Member States than EU Member States 
and thereby made it harder for the Commission to perform its coordination role (Interview F, l 31-47). 
 
However, the Commission was involved in developing the foundations for what later became the 
MDGs. The Commission was involved in the “women conference” in Cairo in 1994 and the “social 
conference” in Copenhagen in 1995 both of which laid the foundation for what later became the 
MDGs (Interviews: Y, l 51-61, H, l 37-54, F, l 31-47). Although, It was primarily the EU Member States 
who were in the driving seat, there was coordination between them, involving the Commission 
(Interviews: Y, l 51-61, H, l 76-90). As mentioned previously the EU was also involved in the DAC in 
the OECD which took the conclusions from the UN conferences in the 1990s and formulated seven 
development goals in the Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development cooperation report. 
These goals would later be merged together with the goals presented by Kofi Annan’s “we the peoples” 
report (Hulme & Scott, 2007). This is where we find the agent impact of the EU in the MDG process, as 
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the EU helped the Member States coordinate and find common positions during the UN conferences 
in the 1990s (H, l 76-90). 
 
The institutional framework was not suited for Commission involvement when it came to negotiating 
the conversion of the DAC and UN goals into the MDGs. There were several reasons for this: The 
MDG policies themselves did not align very well with the Commission’s focus at the time. The 
policies in the MDGs were mainly focused on the developing countries’ problems (Interview Y, l 46-
48), which reduced the relevancy of Commission involvement. Poverty reduction was an essential 
part of the MDGs and it was a subject that did not have much attention in the Commission at the time 
(Interview Y, l 69-71). To add even more to this discrepancy, the task of managing development aid 
was divided among the Commissioners responsible for different geographical areas (ec.europa.eu 2, 
visited 10.06.16). 
5.1.2 Control mechanisms 
As we have examined in a previous section on Control mechanisms there are many different ways a 
principal can control or limit the actions of her agent. The control mechanisms (Billiet, 2009: 440, 
Damro, 2007: 889, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 438, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) can be divided into two 
categories ex-ante (Pollack, 1997: 108) and ex-post (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, 
Pollack, 1997: 108-109), the former is the mandate given to the agent and the rules she must adhere to, 
the latter is the oversight procedures and the sanctions available to the principal. There were actually 
control mechanisms in place, even though the Commission’s involvement in the MDG process was 
limited. 
 
Ex-ante 
The MDG process happened before the Lisbon Treaty and it was therefore up to the Member State 
that had the Presidency to relay the EU’s opinion at the UN (Interview H, l 273-274), which meant the 
rules limited how the EU institutions could get involved, by having the Council Presidency as a 
gatekeeper, with direct control over how the Commission could be involved. Furthermore, as shown 
previously, the Member States did not create a mandate enabling the Commission to get involved in 
that process. 
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Ex-post 
Even if the Commission managed to get the Presidency to present a Commission opinion or a 
common position for the EU Member States, all the Member States were present in both the OECD 
and the UN, making the oversight very direct and ensuring the Commission would not be able to act 
outside of their mandate. It is very likely the Commission would be sanctioned and lose trust 
(Interview F, l 332-334) if it acted in a way the Member States did not authorise it to. 
5.1.3 Moral hazard 
Principals delegate authority and responsibility to an actor if that actor can perform the given tasks 
more efficiently, but delegation of authority can lead to the unintended side effect moral hazard 
(Eisenhart, 1987: 61, Miller, 2005: 205), namely drifting (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 
1997: 108), shirking (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61), and slippage (Billet, 2009: 439). We will in 
the following sections investigate if aspects of moral hazard occurred even though, as we showed 
previously, the EU’s involvement was limited and even if it took a more active role in the MDG 
process it would be almost impossible to manoeuvre, because the Commission would constantly be 
watched by the Member States, as they were present in all relevant fora. 
 
We have not identified any asymmetry in preferences between the EU and its Member States in the 
MDG process. In addition, given the control mechanisms limiting the EU’s involvement in both the 
OECD and the UN during the MDG process, it would be extremely unlikely for the Commission to 
intentionally drift, shirk, or slip, as the Member States most likely would discover it immediately and 
thereby make sanctioning a real possibility. 
5.1.4 Summary 
The EU was not directly involved in the development of the MDGs, the EU coordinated with its 
Member States in New York and at several UN conferences in the 1990s, which laid the foundation for 
what later became the MDGs. The EU was also present in the OECD DAC, where they were part of 
adopting the results from the UN conferences in the 1990s into seven goals for development. In that 
process the Commission was subject to extensive control mechanisms. In both the OECD and the UN 
the control mechanisms severely limited its ability to shirk, slip, and drift, because EU Member States 
were present at all of the UN conferences, the New York coordination meetings and in the DAC. This 
meant that the Commission was almost certain to lose trust if it drifted or shirked and did not follow 
the wishes of the Member States. 
Page 58 of 96 
 
It therefore seems that there is barely any evidence to suggests that the EU institutions acted in a way 
that conflicted with the wishes of the Member States in the MDG process. The EU was also involved 
differently before, during and after the MDG process, which fits with the notion that the 
Commission’s role vary over time (Billiet, 2009: 439). 
 
Theory derived area of interest Findings 
The EU - Member State relationship in the MDG process 
EU Involvement The EU was not involved in the actual negotiation of 
the MDGs, it did however have a coordination role at 
the UN conferences in the 1990s that was the 
foundation of the MDGS. There are several reasons for 
the lack of EU involvement in the MDG negotiations. 
DG DEVCO felt it was not appropriate to participate, as 
they lacked the trust of the Member States and would 
be unwelcomed, the MDG goals was concerned with 
developing countries and focused on poverty 
reduction, which were areas that was not a priority for 
the Commission. 
Control mechanisms Ex ante:  EU was given no formal mandate and was 
represented by Council President 
 
Ex post: If the EU had decided to participate in the 
MDG negotiations it would have been subject to direct 
oversight and possibly sanctions as EU Member States 
are present in all the relevant areas.  
Moral Hazard Given the strong oversight and possible sanctions it 
would be extremely unlikely for the Commission to 
intentionally drift or shirk, as the Member States most 
likely would discover it immediately. 
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5.2 SDG 
The previous sub-chapter 5.1 MDG has given us our starting point for analysing the change in the EU-Member 
State relationship at the UN. We have determined the Commission’s role in the negotiations, the control 
mechanisms available to the Member States and the risk of drifting, shirking and slippage. We now look at the 
same themes for the SDG negotiations, so we can compare the two processes and determine the change in the 
relationship. 
5.2.1 Formal role and involvement 
Our interviews as well as the council conclusions shows the formal role of the EU was loosely defined. 
The council defined the EU’s role in a Council conclusion: 
“The EU and its Member States commit to playing an active and constructive role in all on-going 
processes and to support their convergence in order to achieve a single overarching post 2015 
framework.” (...) The EU and its Member States will continue to further develop priority areas, taking 
into account the proposals outlined in the Commission Communication and proposals by other 
partners. The Council will continue to follow and engage in the international processes and define and 
adapt, as necessary, the position of the EU and its Member States towards an overarching post 2015 
agenda.” (Council of the European Union, 2013  
 
This suggests that the contract between the Member States as principals and the EU as the agent was 
not a result of the ultimatum bargaining described in the section on theory, where the agent is 
presented with a take-it or leave-it offer. The Council conclusion binds the EU to be active in the 
process and thus is incapable of leaving the offer on the table. 
Because of this loosely defined formal role of the EU it is important to note that there were two phases 
in the SDG negotiations. There was the OWG sessions where, according to our interview with a 
Member State representative, the EU only got involved if it was specifically asked or if the subject was 
related to an EU exclusive competence (Interview B, l 218-234). However, the EU would, according to 
our findings from the interviews as well as from written statements in the OWG, make an opening or 
a closing statement at each session of the OWG (Interviews: A, l 215-225, C, l 188-192, D, l 271-276) in 
order to present the general EU position (see for example sustainabledevelopment.un.org 3, visited 
28.06.16). 
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The other track was the intergovernmental negotiations that followed the work done in the OWG 
where our interview with a Commission official showed the EU was very much involved and spoke 
on each of the goals in the SDG (Interview A, l 173-175). This could merely be the case of the EU 
having a different role in the two different phases, but our interviews indicate there is a disconnect 
between how the EU explained its role and how a Member State representative explained it. The main 
difference between the two stories lies in the explanation of the agreements made in internal EU 
negotiations in Brussels and the EU’s role at the UN. Both an EU official and a Member State official 
we interviewed indicated there was agreement on the purpose of the SDGs and agreed on the main 
objectives with the agreement (Interviews: A, l 70-83, B, l 70-79. Though they also mentioned that 
there were aspects of the SDGs that not all Member States were in favour of (Interview B, l 150-169) 
and some disagreed with the prioritisation of the goals (Interviews: A, l 233-236). However, there was 
a minor discrepancy regarding the foundation of the negotiations, with Member State officials saying 
the Commission followed the lead of the Member States (Interviews: B, l 286-289, D, l 36-59) and a 
Commission official saying it was the Commission, who originally proposed the issues of 
environmental sustainability and development aid be combined in the SDGs (Interview A, l 31-55). 
This is true, but it seems to be an omission that it was the Member States who first proposed the 
combination (Interview A, l 31-55), if not in writing then verbally. This raises the question of 
observational equivalence. Meaning, did the Commission behave as the Member States wanted it to, 
because it shares its interests or because the control mechanisms worked. Nonetheless, our interviews 
indicate that the Commission follows the wishes of the Member States (Interviews: A, l 31-55, B, l 286-
289). 
 
The process was the following: There were negotiations in Brussels organised by the EU where the 
Member State representatives discussed the SDGs together with the EU officials. The Member States 
and the EU also met in New York before the actual UN meetings to finalise their approach 
(Interviews: A, l 156-167, B, l 112-119, C, l 153-179, D, l 224-232, E, l 430-433). It is the result of the 
meetings in Brussels and the following actions of the EU that varies somewhat in the interviews. 
According to Member State representatives as well as an EEAS official, the EU wanted the Union to 
stand together and negotiate from a common position in the OWG sessions (Interviews: B, l 150-169, 
C, l 188-207, E, l 141-144), but the representative pointed out that the Member State ambassadors had 
more experience and knew such an approach would be counterproductive for the OWG sessions, as it 
would lead to bloc building. The Member States should, therefore, negotiate more individually, but 
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coordinate and agree on the priority of the issues (Interviews:  B, l 150-169, C, l 44-49, E, l 414-417). 
Whereas, the EU official stressed that it was their role to present a combined standpoint for the EU at 
the UN and they spoke on all SDG issues, not just the ones related to an exclusive competence 
(Interviews: A, l 181-199, l 173-175, C, l 188-207, D, l 319-326, E, l 124-142). 
Furthermore, there was also disagreement on aspects of EU involvement, especially contact with non-
EU countries. A Commission representative, an EEAS official, as well as some Member State 
representatives, said the EU conducted informal meetings with non-EU countries, all within the 
mandate given by the Member States, although given the nature of the meetings they had to take 
liberties and bend the mandate (Interviews: A, l 204-206, C, l 483-490, E, l 351-352), but they always 
reported back to the Member States on what had been said at the meetings (Interviews: A, l 197-199, 
C, l 455-467, D, l 606-607). When asked a similar question another Member State representative 
answered “no no no no no” (Interviews: B, l 247), but this discrepancy in the two accounts could be a 
consequence of interviewee B misunderstanding the question or remembering the incidents 
incorrectly, compared to the others. 
 
It seems that the EU’s role during the process is quite fuzzy, as there is disagreement about the 
Commission's actions. However, there are many similarities in the answers the interviewees gave 
about the EU’s involvement. We have identified four areas in which the EU had an agent impact. 
As a coordinator. All of the interviewees explained that the EU helped the Member States by ensuring 
and facilitating coordination (Interview A, l 181-199 B, l 218-234, C, l , D, l 224-332 & E, l 101-102). Most 
EU Member States, which were part of the OWG, were represented in a troika with other UN Member 
States and often also with non-EU countries, as there were more countries that wanted to be part of 
the OWG than there were seats (Interview E, l 22-26). Denmark was for example in a troika with 
Ireland and Norway. In this diffuse process where EU Member States cooperated with non-EU 
countries in troikas, the EU delegation in New York coordinated and facilitated a process where the 
EU Member States agreed to a common position with the other EU Member States. The Member States 
went back to their troika and was trusted to present and defend that position (Interview E, l 222-225). 
 
As information gatherer. The EU functioned as an information centre for its Member States during the 
OWG. The EU would analyse the text proposals from the OWG co-chairs and supply Member States 
with an analysis. This lessened the workload for the Member States considerably and was 
instrumental for getting the SDGs passed (Interview D, l 331-341). 
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Combined EU voice in intergovernmental negotiations. As mentioned above the EU’s role in the 
negotiations changed from the OWG to the intergovernmental negotiations. Whereas the EU had a 
less prominent role in the OWG, it had a quite prominent role in the intergovernmental negotiations. 
In the intergovernmental negotiations the EU coordination became stronger, and the EU pushed to 
ensure that the EU and the Member States were speaking with one voice during the negotiations 
(Interview E, l 580-583). This indicates that the institutional change from the OWG to 
intergovernmental negotiations altered the Member States’ strategic preferences towards stronger EU 
coordination. As discussed in the theory, the institutional setting can influence the agent’s incentive 
structure (Scharpf 2000: 770-771). 
 
Presence at informal meetings. The EU would, as mentioned previously, sit in on informal meetings 
with other important actors in the UN. Here the EU representatives would negotiate based on the EU 
position but with some room to manoeuvre (Interviews: A, l 2004-206, C, l 483-491, E, l 351-352). It is in 
this role as negotiator on behalf of the EU we find the fourth EU agent impact. The EU had many 
representatives present at the intergovernmental negotiations, which enabled them to sit in on almost 
all the informal meetings (Interview C, l 455.467) and then report the positions of the outside 
countries, as well as the possible compromises, back to the Member States. 
 
This suggests that the EU Member States delegated tasks to the EU for several reasons. The first 
reason is continuity. The EU is responsible for coordination and facilitates that the Member States find 
a common position especially in the intergovernmental negotiations. This makes the EU (and its 
Member States) a more effective negotiator (Interview E, l 202-205). If the Member States had one 
position during the OWG, where they were in troikas with other countries, and another position 
during the intergovernmental negotiation, they would lose credibility. This also highlights the second 
reason for delegating authority and responsibility to the EU - their independence. It is accepted by 
most Member States that the EU’s task is to coordinate and develop common positions. If a Member 
State performed this task they might be able to do it, but the other Member States might be less willing 
to let that happen, because they would fear that the coordinating Member State would use that 
position to advance their own interests. This is quite similar to one of the reasons Pollack (1997) 
mentioned for delegating to an agent in order to get independent regulators. In this case you delegate 
Page 63 of 96 
 
to an actor you believe to be credible and independent and would have little incentive to favour one 
party over another (Pollack 1997: 104). 
 
Another reason for the Member States to delegate tasks to the EU is because it is more efficient for the 
Member States to delegate the task to one actor, rather than for all of them to do it themselves. One 
example of this is that the EU conducted an analysis of a text proposal by the OWG co-chairs that at 
least one Member State saw as crucial to the SDGs becoming a reality (Interview D, l 430-433). 
Another example is the facilitation of the whole coordination process. It would be more resource 
demanding for the Member States if they had to talk to all the other Member States individually to 
learn about their positions and then attempt to develop a common position. The same is true for 
gathering the positions of the other countries in the process. Member States would of course meet 
with representative from non-EU countries during the negotiations, but the EU would do that as well 
and then spread the information to the Member States (Interview C, l 455- 467). Especially in the 
informal negotiations this seems to be the case. As mentioned previously the EU had enough 
representatives present in the negotiations to participate in many of the informal discussions that 
many of the Member States could not participate in (Interview C, l 455- 467). By negotiating through 
the EU, many Member States would still be part of the final negotiations, who might otherwise have 
been considered too small or insignificant. These situations can be seen as a result of a resource 
asymmetry between the EU and the Member States as the EU had more diplomats present at the 
intergovernmental negotiations, which enables them to participate in more informal meets than the 
Member States (Interview C, l 433-442) and they have the manpower to make a quick and thorough 
analysis of the text proposal from the co-chairs of the OWG (Interview D, l 331-341). This resource 
asymmetry translates into an information asymmetry, which can be limited by control mechanisms. 
5.2.2 Control mechanisms 
We will be investigating which control mechanisms were in place during the SDG process in the same 
way that we did it in the section on control mechanisms in the MDG process. This means that we will 
examine the ex-ante control mechanisms first and then proceed to look at the ex-post mechanisms 
afterwards. 
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Ex-ante 
The EU’s involvement at the UN and the EU-Member States relationship is not a classic example of 
principal-agent dynamics, at least not regarding control mechanisms, because the delegation of 
authority and responsibility is not formally and specifically defined beforehand. The Council 
conclusion proposes that the EU should have an active and constructive role in the process (Council of 
the European union). This becomes relevant when we examine how the ex-ante control mechanisms 
(Pollack, 1997: 108) for the EU involvement in the SDG negotiations are made. There was not a formal 
agreement between the EU and the Member States outlining specifically how the EU should act and 
what the limits to their involvement should be. But it is important to distinguish between the OWG 
meetings and the intergovernmental meetings as our analysis has shown the EU involvement was 
distinctly different in the two processes. 
 
In the OWG meetings the mandate and the rules were quite simple; the EU could present its opinions 
if the subject was an exclusive EU competence (Interview B, l 218-234) as well as in opening or closing 
statements during the OWG session (Interviews: C, l 188) or if it was asked to do so by others in the 
OWG (Interview B, l 218-234). What the EU presented was a common EU positions on behalf of the 
Member States (Interviews: A, L 156-167, C, l 188-207, E l 124-147). The EU representative started their 
statement in the second OWG meeting by saying: “The EU and its Member States are currently 
elaborating their position on the post-2015 agenda, including on SDGs” 
(sustainabledevelopment.un.org 3, visited 28.06.16) 
However, the Member States stretched this common position in their statements to align it with their 
own interest (Interview A, l 163-167, C, l 188). Although the EU hosted coordination meetings in 
Brussels the Member States were grouped in troikas together with non-EU countries, in the OWG, 
which complicated this effort and frustrated one EU official (Interview E, l 132-134). The EU therefore 
mainly had the role of observer, coordinator and presenter of a common EU position for the EU 
countries in the OWG meetings. 
 
As with the OWG negotiations, our interviews show the intergovernmental negotiations also involved 
numerous meetings in Brussels to establish the common position for the EU and what the EU should 
work for. Furthermore, the EU also held meetings with the Member States in New York before the UN 
meetings where the strategy and objective for the UN meetings was finalised. This means the mandate 
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could be different from one UN meeting to the next. Although the rules were the same for the formal 
intergovernmental meetings. 
The EU would, at the UN meetings, present the common EU position, agreed upon at the coordination 
meetings in Brussels and the meetings in New York, and they would speak on all issues, not merely 
the ones concerning exclusive competences. Their statement was written beforehand and was the 
result of a compromise made between the EU and the Member States, to ensure the EU could speak on 
behalf of the Member States. 
 
However, the participants were aware that the UN negotiations could span many days and it would 
not be possible to prepare for every possible occurrence. Boundaries were, therefore, created for how 
the EU could act, but the EU representatives had room to manoeuvre and the possibility to improvise 
(Interview A, l 204-206). This raises a problem for the Member States: How to ensure the EU would 
not act outside of its mandate in situations that were not planned for? This problem can be somewhat 
solved by implementing both oversight procedures and sanctioning possibilities, which are both ex-
post control mechanisms (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109). 
 
Ex-post 
Ex-ante control mechanisms (Pollack, 1997: 108) are not the only control mechanisms (Billiet, 2009: 
440, Damro, 2007: 889, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 438, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) available to the 
principal, there are also ex-post, which can be particularly effective if the mandate and the rules of 
delegation of authority are vague or inadequate. These ex-post control mechanisms, as discussed in 
the theory chapter on Control mechanisms, are methods with which the principal can oversee the 
workings of the agent and sanction the agent in case the agent does not fulfil its responsibilities 
(Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109). 
Through our interviews we have found that especially the oversight procedures have been used 
intensely in both the OWG sessions and the intergovernmental meetings. All our interviewees in the 
SDG process, both EU and Member State representatives, have stressed the importance of 
coordination meetings between the EU and the Member States (Interviews: A, l 112-130, B, l 218-234, 
C, l 288-310, D, l 223-232, E l 449-452). This enabled the Member State representatives to immediately 
react to EU suggestions and prevent actions they did not agree with. An example of this is present in 
the discussion on gender equality and sexual rights. The Member States were divided on these issues 
(Interviews: B, l 324-330 C, l 473-479), D, l 95-114, E, l 291-292) and discussed them with the EU at the 
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coordination meetings so they, before the OWG meetings, could ensure that the EU did not present a 
position that all the Member States could not agree with (Interview A, l 181-199). This could be 
understood as an ex-ante control mechanism considering the Member States could decide on the role 
of the EU going into the UN negotiations, but we identify it as an ex-post mechanism. The EU had 
been given a mandate to act as coordinator for the Member States and this mechanism is therefore ex-
post, because it monitors how the EU perform the task of coordinating. 
Most of the disagreements in the coordination meetings before the OWG sessions was on negotiation 
strategy. The EU and the Member States had different views on how to proceed, but as a Member 
State representative put it: “ we just said no, so you know, they did not do that” (Interview B, l 286-
289). This dispute about negotiation strategy is the only area where we have identified an asymmetry 
in preferences between the EU and the Member States. This form of control seems be to a form of 
immediate sanctioning. If the EU propose a policy issue or strategy the Member States disagree with, 
they can immediately discard it and decide on what the EU mandate should be. One of the outcomes 
of sanctioning mentioned in section on Control mechanisms is exactly the changing of the ex-ante control 
mechanisms; the mandate (Pollack, 1997: 109). 
Another widely used oversight mechanism is that whenever the EU presented the common EU 
position in the UN, or simply spoke at UN meetings, the Member States were present (Interview A, l 
294-300 C, l 188). This has nothing to do with the way the delegation of authority between the Member 
States and the EU is set up, because it is how the UN works, but it brings an interesting aspect to the 
way the EU could act on behalf of the Member States. It meant the Member States would intervene 
immediate, as with the coordination meetings, when the EU failed to perform its agreed tasks and as 
one Member State representative said: 
 
“you could see always see in the room next to the EU seat I was kind of up in the back of the room 
you could always line of EU member state delegates who were standing in line to talk to the EU 
colleagues who were seeded in the seat before and after and sometimes during a statement while the 
statement was being read out because they might have missed something that was agreed at the very 
last moment and the it wasn't read out or something and you had added in the end of the statement 
but of course it is also something that happens during negotiations because you have all EU member 
states the calling and texting and emailing you and sometimes things are just missed.” (Interview C, l 
320-327). 
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The formal meetings in the OWG sessions and the intergovernmental negotiations were not the only 
avenue available to the EU. There were “plenty and plenty of informal meetings” (Interview A, l 197) 
where the Member States were not present at all or at least to a lesser degree than the formal meetings 
(Interviews: A, l 181-199, C, l 524- 530). There were two kinds of meetings that we talk about when we 
mention ‘informal’ meetings. There were the meetings in the breaks during the UN meetings (C, l 524- 
530) and the meetings between the EU and non-EU countries (Interview A, l 181-199). It is reasonable 
to assume the oversight mechanism in the meetings with a few Member States present, functioned 
similar to the large meetings with all Member States present. However, the oversight for the meetings 
with no Member States present had to be different. For these meetings the EU official would debrief 
the Member States and tell them what had been said at the meetings (Interview A, l 181-199). In this 
case the Member States had to trust that the information the EU reported back to them was 
comprehensive. This exposed the EU to moral hazards, as the Member States will not get all the 
relevant information from the meetings unless the EU provides it to them. 
5.2.3 Moral hazard 
Through our analysis of the data gathered, we have found that the EU had the role of presenting 
proposals to the Member States, coordinating the Member States, and presenting their common 
position at the UN. We also found that the Member States established the rules and mandate for the 
EU through ex-ante control mechanisms (Pollack, 1997: 108) and they ensured the EU followed the 
rules and mandate, by setting up ex-post control mechanisms (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 
2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109). We will now consider whether this prevented the EU from drifting 
(Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108), shirking (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 
61), or being the subject of slippage (Billet, 2009: 439). 
 
Drifting 
The results of the interviews show that on the surface there is not much room for the EU to act outside 
of its mandate. Its main role is coordination among Member States and for the EU to drift it would 
have to do more than coordinate, meaning it would either have to decide on the EU position without 
consulting Member States, make deals with non-EU countries without the consent of the Member 
States, or make deals directly at the UN. The latter is impossible since the EU is only an observer and 
therefore cannot vote. The other two are a bit trickier to analyse because their mandate was somewhat 
loosely defined and varied from the OWG sessions to the intergovernmental negotiations. 
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Nonetheless, we have found that it was the Member States who decided the common EU position 
(Interviews: A, l 181-199, B, l 286-289, D, l 416-425) although during the intergovernmental 
negotiations the EU would analyse UN documents and provide suggestions for the common position 
(Interview D, l 331-341)). As shown previously there was disagreement between the EU and the 
Member States regarding strategy. The situation was that the EU proposed that the Member States 
should act as a bloc. The Member States, however, wanted to limit bloc building in the OWG and 
therefore discarded the EU's bloc strategy. 
One area where the EU had a more active role was when the policy in question concerned an 
exclusive competence, then the EU would be more involved in determining the common position 
(Interview A, l 173-175), but this cannot be classified as drifting, because it is within the given 
mandate that the EU is supposed to be more active in developing a common EU position when it 
concerns its exclusive competences. 
When examining the EU’s opportunity to drift, when conducting meetings with non-EU countries, it 
seems that the oversight mechanisms worked well and ensured the EU would not make unsanctioned 
deals, because it would have to report back to the Member States (Interview A, l 181-199). The control 
mechanism seems to have worked well because (1) the EU would have no incentive to intentionally 
drift and present positions that were too far from the agreed EU position, considering the EU's 
negotiation mandate was dependent on how much the Member States trusted the EU. If it presented a 
position that was unacceptable to the Member States in the negotiations and it did not report it 
correctly the EU risked getting caught as the Member States could talk to the other participants in the 
meeting. (2) The EU had no formal power to coerce the Member States to vote for an agreement they 
did not like as the Member States can decide on their own how to vote in the UN. Furthermore, it did 
not have the power to make binding agreements with outside countries. However, the control 
mechanism then relies on the honesty of the agent, but it does not seem likely the EU would have 
gained much by being dishonest, because as mentioned previously it could not make binding 
agreements with non-EU countries. 
 
Shirking 
Whereas drifting is the term for the agent doing something more or something different than the 
principal intended (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108), shirking is when the agent 
does not do what the principal wants it to do (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61) to the detriment 
Page 69 of 96 
 
of the principal (Billiet, 2009: 439). Through our analysis we have identified three areas with the 
possibility for the EU to shirk. 
When the EU organised coordination meetings, when it presented the common position at the UN 
(both OWG and intergovernmental sessions) and when the Commission analysed UN documents for 
the Member States. 
We know the Member States were very satisfied with the EU’s efforts to coordinate the Member States 
and help them come up with a common position (Interviews: A, l 112-130, D, l 430-433, E, l 316-320). It 
was only the subject of “sexual and reproductive health and rights” (SRHR) for women where the EU 
did not take an active role, but this cannot be considered shirking, because the Member States wanted 
to deal with the controversial issue themselves (Interviews: B, l 324-330, C, l 473-479, D, l 95-114, E, l 
291-296). We have therefore found no evidence of the EU shirking in the coordination meetings, nor 
have we found a motive for the EU to shirk. 
As shown in the section on control mechanisms the EU representatives sometimes failed to present the 
common position in the UN to the satisfaction of the Member States. However, we think this was 
unintentional for a number of reasons. First of all, the Member States were present at the meetings and 
could intervene and ‘force’ the EU to correct its omission and the common position was also 
distributed in writing, making the EU’s chance of avoiding a subject almost impossible. It is therefore 
very unlikely the EU would even try to shirk given the control mechanisms and a Member State 
representative said when it happened it was unintentional and a result of fatigue in the long meetings 
(Interview C, l 315-327). 
Finally, is the EU’s analysis of UN documents, which could provide an opportunity to shirk. Just like 
the Commission could chose to overemphasize one issue and make that analysis more thorough they 
could de-emphasise another issue. However, this is a theoretical speculation and there has been no 
evidence of this. What is possible is to give a reasonably estimation of why the Commission would do 
it. It seems unlikely that the Commission would willingly do a poor analysis of a subject, because if 
the Member States suspected anything, they could do the analysis themselves and the Commission 
would lose their trust. However, they could perhaps present fewer suggestions for the subjects they 
thought were less important. Our interviews showed the subject of SRHR for women divided the 
Member States (Interviews: B, l 324-330, C, l 473-479, D, l 95.114, E, l 291-292). The Commission might 
be less inclined to suggest something several Member States would disagree with. This could be 
mistaken for shirking but as mentioned earlier, this cautious approach was in line with the Member 
States’ wishes. 
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Slippage 
Slippage, being caused by the institutional framework surrounding the agent (Billet, 2009: 439), is 
quite different from drifting (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108) and shirking 
(Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61) as it is the incentives provided in the institutional framework 
that distorts the actions of the agent, instead of the agent's own interests (Billet, 2009: 439). What we 
found in the OWG sessions is that the troika framework limited the EU’s ability to coordinate the 
Member States, which some of them preferred (Interviews: B, l 150-168, E, l 579-580), but the EU 
representatives did not like it (Interview E, l 71-80). This did not occur in the intergovernmental 
negotiations and besides being able to coordinate the Member States the EU also had no problem 
being part of informal meetings with non-EU countries (Interviews: C, l 411-413, A, l 181-199). 
Furthermore, we have not found any empirical evidence that the ex-ante control mechanisms ‘force’ 
or incentivise the EU to act to the detriment of the Member States or itself. 
5.2.4 Summary 
It has been shown in the analysis that the EU had the mandate to coordinate and help the Member 
States agree on a common position that the EU would present at the UN. The mandate was different 
from the OWG sessions to the intergovernmental negotiations. In the OWG the EU would present the 
common position, but their coordinating task was made more difficult because of the troikas. The 
intergovernmental negotiations were quite different as it allowed the EU to be more efficient in 
coordinating the Member States because the troikas were dissolved, and there was an acceptance from 
the Member States that the EU should act as a block in the negotiations. 
Oversight procedures were the main control mechanism used, they prevented the EU from drifting 
and shirking. When the EU proposed something like a different strategy in the coordination meetings, 
the Member States could and would discard that suggestions and decide on their own on the issue. 
Furthermore, the Member States were in the same formal meetings as the EU, which ensured drifting 
or shirking could be discovered and corrected immediately. The EU also had to report to the Member 
States on its informal meetings with non-EU countries, limiting its ability to drift or shirk. It does not 
seem like the EU had many possibilities for not fulfilling its role to the satisfaction of the Member 
States and the interviewees from the Member States also stressed that they were very satisfied with 
the EU’s involvement in the process and thought it was instrumental in achieving a result the Member 
States were happy with (Interview D, l 430-433). 
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Theory derived area of interest Findings 
The EU - Member State relationship in the SDG process 
EU Involvement EU had the mandate to coordinate and help the 
Member States agree on a common position that the EU 
would present at the UN. In the OWG the EU would 
present the common position, but their coordinating 
task were made more difficult because of the troikas. 
The intergovernmental negotiations were quite 
different as it allowed the EU to be more efficient in 
coordinating the Member States because the troikas was 
dissolved, and there was an acceptance from the 
Member States that the EU should act as a block in the 
negotiations 
Control mechanisms Ex ante: the EU was given a mandate to coordinate and 
help the Member States agree on a common position 
that the EU would present at the UN and negotiate on 
their behalf in the intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
Ex post: EU was subject to direct oversight for most of 
the process and when it was not it had to report back to 
the Member States.   
Moral Hazard The EU’s moral hazard seems to be limited, as the 
Member States were able to reject a negotiation tactic 
they disagreed with and when the EU neglected to 
presented the position of the Member States in the 
negotiations would be able to make the EU to add the 
omitted content in the end or in the written statements 
submitted to the Co-chairs. 
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6. Analysis part 2 
The previous chapter answered questions on the two cases in terms of the EU’s involvement, which control 
mechanisms were in place and whether the EU acted in accordance with the Members States’ interests. The 
answers to these questions allow us to conduct a controlled comparison between the two cases, as we asked the 
exact same questions to both of them. The first part of this chapter will present the results of the controlled 
comparison. The chapter’s second part will discuss these findings in regard to the existing academic work using 
PA theory to understand the foreign policy aspects of the EU. Followed by a section that examines the findings 
that do not conform with the theoretical preconceptions. Last is a summarisation of the most important results of 
the chapter. 
6.1 Differences between the MDG and SDG processes 
Chapter 5 on the MDG and SDG processes showed that the EU was part of both processes but to different 
degrees. These differences in the EU’s involvement and relationship with its Member States yield some 
interesting findings when examined closer. 
The EU was tasked with coordinating the Member States in both processes (Interviews: A, l 181-199, B, 
l 218-234, C,l 288-310, D, l 224-232, E, l 71-118, H, l: 76-90, Y, l 148-153). The EU had a more structured 
and formal coordination mandate for UN meetings during the SDG process. The EU’s involvement in 
the SDGs was more structured because the process itself was more structured. The Commission, as 
well as the Member States, did not expect the results of the UN conferences in the 1990s to be 
converted into specific operationalised development goals (Interview H, l: 175-186), while the 
intentions of the OWG clearly was to develop the SDGs. 
 
The EU was more directly involved in the SDG process and although the EU was also part of 
developing common positions for the UN conferences in the 1990s, it did not present those common 
positions and represent the Member States as in the SDG process. The EU was also less directly 
involved in the MDG process because it had to have the Council Presidency presenting the common 
positions and did not conduct informal meetings with non-EU countries (Interview H, l 75-76). This is 
partly because the EU Member States wanted the EU institutions to be part of the SDG process and 
thought they were vital in getting the SDGs passed (Interview D, l 331-341), while the EU institutions 
would have been unwelcomed if they were very active during the MDG process, as the Member States 
did not completely trust the competences of the Commission in development matters (Interview F, l 
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332- 334). The Lisbon Treaty also seems to play a part in the different degrees of involvement as the 
Lisbon Treaty changed who should represent the EU at the UN. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU 
would be represented by the Council Presidency, while after the Lisbon Treaty the EU would be 
represented by the Commission or the EEAS (Guimarães, 2015). The treaty also clarifies that it is the 
EU’s responsibility to undertake a coordination role in IOs (Article 34 TEU). 
 
Replacing the Council Presidency with a representative from the EU institutions required that EU got 
its UNGA observer mandate upgraded, so that: 
 
“The EU can now participate in the general debate of the General Assembly, (...) and (is) able to speak 
at the end of any morning or afternoon session taking into account the level of the EU representative. 
(...) the arrangements also give the EU delegation the right to be inscribed in the speakers list of formal 
UN meetings among representatives of major groups. In effect, this allows EU representatives to 
replace the rotating presidencies, present EU positions in formal meetings” (Guimarães, 2015: 99). 
 
This has increased the EU’s legitimacy when participating in the work in the OWG and in the 
following intergovernmental negotiations in the eyes of both EU Member States as well as non-EU 
countries, with the OWG co-chairs requesting more EU coordination, echoed by some Member States 
towards the end of the intergovernmental negotiations (Interview E, l 559-603). The EU 
representatives would have been seriously limited in speaking and participating in meetings at the 
UN if the EU’s observer mandate in the UNGA had not been enhanced. The EU representative would 
only have been allowed to speak at the end of meetings and would not be invited to speak in the 
general debates (Guimarães, 2015: 88-89). With the establishment of the EEAS and the EU delegation 
in New York, the EU more than doubled its manpower in New York (Interview G, l 110-124) dealing 
with the UN, which has also helped the EU become more active in the SDGs, as they were able to 
participate in almost all of the informal meetings during the intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
The responsibilities, which DG DEVCO now has, was in the Santer Commission (1995-1999) split up 
on several commissioners (aei.pitt.edu, visited 28.06.16), and EU aid was based on some Members 
States’ interests instead of best practices. EU aid was before then seen in a post-colonial light 
(Interview F, l. 71-81). This meant that DG DEVCO was struggling to win the trust of the Member 
States and therefore chose to reorganising its programmes (Interviews: F, l 284-305, Y, l 84-87). So DG 
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DEVCO was ill equipped to take an active role in the MDG negotiations and thus stayed out. For the 
SDG case however, EU aid had become more consensual and DG DEVCO had regained the trust of 
the Member States and gotten its house in order, which meant that it fulfilled the prerequisites for 
getting involved in the process. 
 
Considering the discussion above it seems as if the EU had the means to have a stronger involvement 
in the SGDs compared to the MDGs because the Lisbon Treaty clarified the EU’s role at the UN, the 
EU institutions represented the EU instead of the Council Presidency, and strong EU-coordination 
was considered legitimate by both Member States and outside partners. Furthermore, the EEAS got 
more staff at the UN and DG DEVCO got its own house in order and regained the trust of the Member 
States. This showed that the EU had the means to take a more active role in the SDGs but did it also 
have the motive? 
 
We have identified three motives for the EU institutions to have taken a stronger role in the SDG than 
in the MDG process. The first motive is the policy content of the SDGs. The policy content was more 
relevant to the EU than in the MDGs. This is because the policy content in the MDGs were focused on 
poverty reduction, which was not a grave concern in the EU (Interview Y, l 69-71) whereas the policy 
areas where the EU is heavily involved, like environment and energy, had a more prominent role in 
the SDGs (Interview F, l 93-113). The EU countries also have to fulfil SDG goals, while the MDG goals 
centred on developing countries, which meant that the goals were also relevant for many EU policies, 
which is the second motive for the EU institutions being more interested in the SDGs than the MDGs. 
The third motive is that development issues and poverty reduction has become more prominent 
issues in the Commission’s work since the development of the MDGs. The Commission used the 
MDGs to structure a lot of its development programmes and policies (Interview F, l 227-336), this 
means that the goals that are going to replace the MDGs become important, because they are going to 
influence the Commission’s and the EEAS’ development policies and programmes (Interview F, l 227-
336). 
6.1.1 Control mechanisms 
Although we found distinct differences in the involvement of the EU in the two processes, the control 
mechanisms that were in place are quite similar in their function if not in their use and effect. There 
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were ex-ante (Pollack, 1997: 108) and ex-post (Miller, 2005: 211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, 
Pollack, 1997: 108-109) control mechanisms in both cases, though not to the same extent. 
 
Ex-ante 
The main difference in the control mechanisms between the two cases were the ex-ante control 
mechanisms. Whereas the EU had no clear mandate in the MDG process, except pre-MDG, it had a 
clearly defined mandate in the SDG process, where it was tasked with coordinating the Member 
States, presenting the common position at UN meetings and it could also negotiate with non-EU 
countries. Although the mandate was clearly defined it could vary from one meeting to the next and 
from the OWG meetings to the intergovernmental meetings, it was not stable or stagnant. In the OWG 
meetings the EU’s role was quite similar to its role in the MDG process in the way it could coordinate 
the Member States, but it could also present the common position. In the intergovernmental meetings 
negotiations between regional groups had increased and the EU had a more active role in negotiating 
on behalf of the Member States, although the Member States had well established ex-post mechanisms 
to control the EU’s actions. 
 
Ex-post 
In the MDG process we found the control mechanisms to be almost entirely ex-post consisting of 
oversight procedures that deterred the Commission from getting involved in the MDG process, as the 
Member States were present throughout the whole process. The Commission was involved pre-MDG 
and post-MDG, but it did not involve itself in the MDG process itself, because it was certain to be 
caught doing so and it would lose trust if it was caught since the Member States did not want it to be 
involved. The ex-ante control mechanisms consisted of the rules surrounding the EU Presidency, but 
there was no mandate for the EU in the MDG process. The SDG process mainly used the same ex-post 
mechanisms, relying heavily on oversight procedures that enabled the Member States to monitor the 
EU’s actions in most situations. They were present in the fora where the EU presented the common 
position and they were informed of the informal meetings the EU representatives had with non-EU 
countries. Similar to the MDG process a failure to follow the given mandate would result in sanctions, 
most likely the loss of trust or a narrowing of the mandate. We did identify one incidence of 
sanctioning in the SDG process, when the EU proposed a different strategy than the Member States 
wanted and in this case the Member States specifically told the EU to follow their chosen strategy 
(Interviews: B, l 150-169, E, l 71-118). 
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An important reason for why there were more control mechanisms, especially ex-ante, is the 
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. It gave the EU a more authoritative and legitimate reason to be 
involved and more control mechanisms followed as a consequence. The EU Member States have 
always been present in the UNGA, so direct oversight there is not something new, but the EU’s 
increased role in informal meetings with non-EU countries required better ex-ante and ex-post control 
in the form of a clear mandate and the possibility to monitor the EU’s actions and sanction if 
necessary. 
6.1.2 Moral hazards 
Unlike the previous sub-chapters, which followed the structure of chapter 5, this sub-chapter will only 
examine the moral hazards drifting (Billiet, 2009: 439, Damro, 2007: 886, Pollack, 1997: 108) and 
shirking (Damro, 2007: 886, Eisenhart, 1987: 61), since we have found no evidence of slippage (Billet, 
2009: 439) in either the MDG or the SDG case. 
 
Drifting 
Drifting is the moral hazard with the biggest difference between the two cases. Not only did the EU 
have better opportunity to drift in the SDG case than the MDG case, but it also had incentives to do so. 
In the SDG case the EU had a more prominent role than in the MDG and this affected drifting in a 
number of ways. First of all, the EU had a mandate that allowed it to perform informal meetings and 
although there were oversight mechanisms that required it to report back to the Member States, there 
is no guarantee it disclosed all the relevant information. But the structure of delegation prevented the 
EU from signing agreements with non-EU countries and as is the case with some of the other 
possibilities to drift, there seems to be very little reason for the EU to intentionally drift, considering 
the gains are very low compared to the risk and consequence of getting caught. 
The Commission also analysed UN documents on behalf of the Member States in the SDG process, 
something we did not find in the MDG process. This presented the opportunity to drift, as it gave the 
Commission the ability to present suggestions that might be the best solutions for itself, but not for the 
Member States. This is a risk when the agent has an information or resource advantage compared to 
the principal and should be mitigated by the control mechanisms. We found that at least some of the 
smaller Member States lacked the resources to perform this kind of analysis and therefore greatly 
appreciated that the Commission performed this task (D, l 331-341). We did not find any evidence that 
Page 77 of 96 
 
the Commission used this advantage to drift, but this is difficult to detect, unless the Commission was 
caught. 
We did find one attempted case of intentional drifting in the SDG case. The attempted drifting was the 
negotiations strategy. Here the Commission proposed a strategy that was better suited for itself, but it 
did not suit the Member States and was summarily discarded. 
In the MDG case we found no incidence of drifting. The direct oversight mechanism (the fact that the 
Member States were present) deterred the EU from drifting in both the MDG and the SDG cases. 
 
Shirking 
We have found almost no motive for the EU to shirk in either of the two cases. The incentive for the 
EU to be involved has been somewhat the same in the two cases, it wants trust and legitimacy and in 
the case of the SDG also a greater voice at the UN (Interview E, l 458-517). To achieve these goals, it 
must be involved and it would therefore be counterproductive to be inactive. Although the EU’s role 
in the MDG case was very small, thereby reducing the possibility to shirk, we did find a hypothetical 
scenario where they could shirk. We have not found any indication that the Member States wanted 
the EU to have a greater role in the MDG process, but a Commission official stated the Commission 
did not want to be part of the negotiations before it had solved its internal problems first. The 
hypothetical could therefore occur if the Member States requested the EU be part of the negotiations, 
when the Commission did not yet want to be part of the negotiations. 
In the SDG case we found one instance of the EU shirking, when they failed to convey the EU 
common position satisfactory, but it seems to be unintentional given the effective oversight 
mechanisms and the issue of fatigue (Interview C, l 315-327). The Member States intervened 
immediately in the meetings if the common EU position was not presented in a satisfactory way. The 
common position was also distributed in writing, further reducing the EU’s possibility to avoid 
certain subjects. 
As with the subject of drifting, the Commission could also shirk when it analysed documents for the 
Member States, by not disclosing suggestions that would be good for the Member States but 
unfavourable for itself. Just like with drifting we did not find any evidence of this, but it would also be 
hard to detect unless the Commission was caught. 
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6.2 Similarities with our theoretical preconceptions 
The theory chapter examined studies by Billiet (2009), Damro (2007), Niemann & Huigens (2001) and 
Nedergaard & Jensen (2014) that had applied principal-agent theory to study the EU in IOs. We will now reflect 
upon how our findings correspond with those studies. First, we will consider the rigorousness of control 
mechanisms. 
The PA theory stipulates that an agent will make ex-ante (Pollack, 1997: 108) and ex-post (Miller, 2005: 
211, Niemann & Huigens, 2011: 432, Pollack, 1997: 108-109) control mechanisms to limit the negative 
side effects from delegation, but only to the degree that it makes economic sense (Pollack, 1997: 108-
109). We have in our thesis found very strong control mechanisms and very few moral hazards, which 
fits the theoretical expectation. Ex-post mechanisms, which we have found to be very prevalent in the 
EU-Member States relationship, are used to reduce information asymmetry and reward or punish the 
agent based on behaviour. There were information asymmetries in some areas of the SDG case, with 
the EU conducting meetings with either no or few Member States present. The EU also did analysis on 
behalf of the Member States with which they potentially gained an information advantage. It therefore 
makes sense to find oversight procedures in these areas. The EU had to report back regarding the 
meetings and the Member States could potentially redo parts of the analysis, although some of the 
Member States might lack the necessary resources. An interesting deviation from the theory is the 
presence of oversight in the UNGA, where all the Member States are present while the EU acts on its 
behalf. It would be illogical from an economic viewpoint to have all principals present to monitor the 
agent. However, the institutional framework for the EU’s and the Member States’ involvement in the 
UNGA help explain why it makes sense to have all principals present. The Member States have to be 
present whether the EU acts on their behalf or not. They can voice their own opinions and elaborate 
on the parts of the common position they think are underrepresented (Interview C, l 188- 207) and 
they also have to be present to vote, something the EU cannot do for them. Furthermore, the fact they 
have to be present in the UNGA in the first place means it is an inexpensive control mechanism, as 
they would have to use resources to be present even if the EU was not. It therefore makes sense to 
have this oversight instead of for example delegate it to another institutional actor. 
In both cases it would seem the control mechanisms are rather inexpensive, which is a bit surprising 
when the theory expects especially ex-post police patrol mechanisms to be expensive (Pollack, 1997: 
108-109). However, in our cases the principals are already present in the fora where the agent is 
inserted and they would therefore have to withdraw from the UNGA to reduce the cost of oversight, 
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but this raises further problems of making another control mechanism and losing direct influence in 
the negotiations, since the EU’s presence adds to the voice of the Member States instead of replacing it. 
 
We are not the first to use PA theory to analyse the EU’s involvement in an IO. In the theory chapter 
we examined existing research to get insights into what others had found when studying the EU in 
IOs. Some of our findings are in accordance with previous research while other parts are 
contradictory. 
Damro (2007) found that the policy issue had an important effect on the delegation of authority, with 
the principal less likely to delegate on politicised issues (Damro 2007). Our findings are in agreement 
with Damro. In the SDG case the EU were not given much autonomy at all, but especially the issue of 
SRHR was heavily debated and the EU therefore took a more passive role on the issue and did not 
involve itself as much in the debate, as on other issues. 
 
What Billiet (2009) found in his study of the EU in the WTO was that the institutional setting had a 
significant effect on the Commission’s ability to drift, with a strong institutional setting (rule-oriented) 
favouring the Commission (Billiet, 2009). It is outside the scope of this thesis whether the UN is rule-
oriented or power-oriented and thereby a strong or weak institutional setting, but it could be 
examined by looking into greater detail about how the actual meetings are conducted in the UN to see 
if the members were given equal time to speak, equal treatment and whether the small countries could 
seek redress in cases of dispute. The analysis has shown that the EU had few possibilities to drift and 
if Billiet’s findings also apply to the UN, then it would suggest that the UN is not a strong institutional 
setting. 
 
Niemann & Huigens (2011) presented a couple of interesting findings in their study of EU 
involvement in the G8. The EU was a good consensus builder and the lack of legally binding rules 
made the Member States less inclined to control the agent (Niemann & Huigens, 2011). We have 
found that the EU representatives actually favoured a bloc strategy and therefore did not act as a 
neutral mediator, but as an agent of the Member States. Furthermore, we found that even though the 
SDGs are not legally binding, there were still strong control mechanisms. However, it is important to 
notice Niemann & Huigens’ study examined a much longer time period compared to our study of the 
SDGs and the long time period was part of the explanation why the Member States, not involved in 
the G8, stopped controlling the Commission’s involvement. 
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Nedergaard & Jensen (2014) found that the EU’s role in coordination had been strengthened as a 
result of the Lisbon Treaty, but with some resistance chiefly from the UK (Nedergaard & Jensen, 2014). 
Our findings seem to support that conclusion. Our analysis concluded that the EU undertook a much 
greater involvement in the SDG process (after Lisbon) than in the MDG process (prior to the Treaty). 
The Lisbon Treaty replaced the Council Presidency, as the EU’s representative at the UN, with the 
EEAS and the Commission (Guimarães, 2015). The Lisbon Treaty clarifies that it is the Commission 
and EEAS’ responsibility to undertake a coordination role in international organisations (Article 34 
TEU). This new, clarified and stronger role gave the Commission and the EEAS the legitimacy to have 
more central roles in EU coordination at the UN. 
6.3 Differences with our theoretical preconceptions 
Not everything we have found in our analysis can be explained by the theoretical framework of PA theory. We 
found other factors that affected the EU-Member States relationship in the two cases, which cannot be explained 
by PA theory. The three factors we found that also had an effect, were the internal structure of the Commission, 
the personality of the people involved, and the rewards sought by the EU for being the agent. 
In the MDG case we found that DG DEVCO was ill equipped to be part of the MDG negotiations even 
if the Member States had wanted it to, which they did not and the Commission’s involvement differed 
in the pre-MDG, MDG and post-MDG periods. 
The fact that the Commission was undergoing a restructuring that according to Commission officials 
meant they could not involve themselves in the MDGs, affected our results. The Commission was, 
therefore, at the time not even inclined to be an actor for the Member States in the MDG process. This 
is probably the reason why the Commission was more engaged and involved in the processes leading 
up to and following the MDG agreement as they took place before and after the restructuring. 
 
The personality of the people involved and the division of the SDG negotiations into two different 
phases seems to have a large effect in the SDG case. 
Our findings show that the personality of the EU officials selected to be part of the processes were 
important for how much influence and involvement the EU had. One Member State representative 
said the Commission representatives’ inexperience was an issue in the OWG sessions (Interview B, l 
186-196) and it was the reason why they proposed an ill-suited strategy that the Member States then 
chose to disregard. At the same time a couple of our interviews express the importance of highly 
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qualified EEAS officials (Interviews: G, l 163-172, E, l 458-507) in the intergovernmental phase of the 
SDG negotiations. Particularly the EU ambassador was a well-respected figure and a former Member 
State ambassador, which gave him and the EEAS instant legitimacy in the eyes of the Member State 
representatives (Interviews: E, l 458-507, G, l 163-172). The top EEAS positions were and are 
prestigious to have and Member States try and get their own people into good EEAS positions 
(Interview G, l 177-182). The OWG sessions limited the EU representatives’ ability to fulfil their 
responsibility of coordinating the Member States (Interview E, l 43-66). Despite this frustration at the 
process, it was an EU official who encouraged the Hungarian Ambassador to take the role of co-chair 
of the OWG sessions (Interview E, l 43-66) once more highlighting the ability of certain individuals to 
influence the process. 
 
We also found that the issues of trust and legitimacy were very important to the EU in both cases. In 
the MDG case the Commission was concerned about losing trust if it acted before it could gain 
legitimacy by restructuring DG DEVCO and implement best practices (Interviews: Y, l 84-87, F, l 332-
334). Whereas in the SDG case the EU’s main objective, besides achieving a good outcome in the 
negotiations, was to gain the Member States’ trust. This brings into question one of the core 
assumptions of PA theory that agents are inherently untrustworthy. According to the theory, agents 
will drift or shirk if they can, in order to maximise their own material gain and are only constrained 
by the principal’s control mechanisms (Billiet, 2009:438-439). This narrow focus on material rewards 
fails to take into account more immaterial rewards, such as legitimacy and trust. If an agent’s goal is to 
obtain the principal’s trust, then it would be a waste of resources to treat them as inherently 
untrustworthy and make control mechanisms to monitor them. This is not to say a principal should 
not have control mechanisms, but she should probably take the agent’s goals into consideration, both 
material and immaterial. The traditional perception that an agent has different preferences than its 
principal presumes that if given the chance the agent will pursue those interests to the detriment of 
the principal (Miller, 2005: 204). However, it does not necessarily affect the principal negatively, if the 
agent’s primary preference is to gain the trust of the principal. Another key assumption in the theory 
is that the principal needs to transfer some of his risk to the agent and offer rewards as compensation 
for the risk sharing to limit moral hazards (Miller, 2005: 204). If the principal does not properly 
understand the preferences of her agent she cannot offer the best rewards. An example could be that 
the EU institutions, if motivated by issues of trust and legitimacy, would prefer a reward such as an 
official statement that acknowledge its part in the result, which would have an effect on how the EU is 
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perceived. On this basis we would join Barnett & Finnemore (2004) in arguing the assumptions in PA 
theory for delegating and acting is too narrowly focused on efficiency and material gain (Pollack, 
2007: 18-19). Focusing only on material gains underestimates the need of some agents to have trust, 
legitimacy and to be recognised by others as an important actor. 
6.4 Summary 
The analysis has shown that there are some similarities between the two cases, but also many 
differences. The EU’s involvement was substantially different in the SDG case than it was in the MDG 
process. In the MDG case neither the Commission nor the Member States wanted the EU to 
participate, whereas in the SDG case, both the EU and the Member States wanted the EU to be more 
involved and present the common position. Furthermore, the EU also performed informal 
negotiations with more freedom than the formal UN negotiations. This increase in the EU’s role also 
led to more control mechanisms. In the MDG case there were few ex-ante control mechanisms, more 
specifically there was a lack of ex-ante control mechanisms as the EU had no established mandate or 
rules to follow. This changed in the SDG case, where the increased role of the EU necessitated ex-ante 
control mechanisms in the form of specific mandates and rules. The ex-post control mechanisms were 
similar in the two cases, with the EU Member States having direct oversight through their own 
representation at the UN and in the coordination meetings. However, the EU’s mandate to conduct 
informal meetings meant the Member States established control mechanisms that required the EU 
representatives to report on the meetings. Moral hazards were almost non-existent in both cases, with 
the EU having almost no reason to intentionally drift or shirk. The only possible case of intentional 
drifting we found was in the SDG case, with the EU representatives proposing a different strategy 
than what the Member States preferred. 
 
Our results are primarily consistent with the theoretical preconceptions. We have found that strong 
control mechanisms reduce the risk of moral hazard, but we have also found that strong control 
mechanisms are not necessarily expensive or established on economic reasoning. Like Damro (2007) 
we found that on the more politicised subject of SRHR the EU had even less autonomy than on other 
issues. Contrary to what Niemann & Huigens (2011) found, our results indicate the EU is not a neutral 
negotiator in the UN, but a representative of the Member States. Lastly, our results also show the EU 
has a stronger coordination role as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, which is in line with Nedergaard & 
Jensen’s (2014) findings. 
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The third part of this chapter presented some factors that could not be explained by the PA theory, but 
nevertheless influenced the EU-Member States relationship. The first factor we found was that DG 
DEVCO was being restructured and EU Member States questioned its effectiveness during the MDG 
process. This meant that DG DEVCO stayed out of the process even though it would have liked to 
participate if the restructuring was done. The second factor we found was the importance of 
individuals in terms of skill and experience. Appointing a former Member State UN ambassador to be 
the EU’s representative at the UN, meant that the EU could act more effectively as the EU 
representative was a familiar face and already knew how to act within the UN system. The third and 
final finding, which was different from the theoretical preconceptions, was the importance of 
legitimacy and trust for the EU. Material rewards were not their objective and they sought to gain 
trust in the eyes of the Member States and legitimacy internationally. 
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7. Discussion 
We have so far mainly focused on how our findings fit with PA theory. In the literature review we examined 
previous studies that analysed the EU in IOs. Some of the studies also used PA theory and we discussed how our 
findings correlated with their results in the previous chapter. This chapter discuss how our results fit with the 
other relevant studies from the literature review, thereby providing a greater picture of how our results fit in the 
larger context of the EU in IOs. 
7.1 Insights from literature review 
We have made findings that are similar to the findings in some of the studies we examined in our literature 
review, even though they used different theories and methods to study other IOs than we have done. This section 
examines our findings compared to the results of studying other IOs using other methods and theories and how 
our insights contribute to the understanding of the EU in IOs. 
7.1.1 Institutional setting and formal role 
The Lisbon Treaty established the legal role of the EU institutions in external relations. But how the 
EU participate in specific IOs is not necessarily stagnant and unchanging. The EU’s method of 
interacting with IOs can change over time, depending on the internal functioning and policy 
capabilities of the EU institutions. As Kissack (2014) found in his study of the EU participation in the 
ILO, this can vary between institutional, horizontal, and vertical consistency (Kissack, 2014). The 
analysis has shown that in the MDG process the EU mainly downloaded the policy and implemented 
it into its development policy after the MDGs. This is similar to Kissack’s findings that when the EU 
lacked expertise, comparable to the ILO, it sought institutional consistency by recommending ILO 
policies for the Member States to ratify (Kissack, 2014), although in our case it is the EU not the 
Member States that downloads the policy. In the SDG process the EU has sought to both participate in 
the development of the policy and implement it, which is similar to what Kissack call institutional and 
vertical consistency describing a situation where the EU is both downloading and uploading policy to 
the ILO (Kissack, 2014). For the SDG case it would be the EU uploading policy to the UN. 
Furthermore, the EU has also sought to merge the issues of development and environmental 
sustainability, which is similar to Kissack’s conceptualisation of horizontal consistency (Kissack, 2014: 
xx). Overall it seems the EU has gone from seeking institutional consistency in the MDG process to all 
three kinds of consistency in the SDG, which indicates Kissack’s findings might be relevant in other 
cases than the EU-ILO. 
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Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve (2014) studied how and why the EU’s role in IOs 
changed over time. They divided the EU’s potential status into five different categories. They 
considered the EU a member if it was recognised as a formal member, a participant if it was able to 
vote - but not legally a formal member - an observer if it was allowed to table proposals or 
amendments, an attendant if it participated in several meetings, and absent if it did not participate in 
several meetings (Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve, 2014). They investigated the EU’s 
role in the DAC, FAO, GATT, G8, G20, ILO, OECD and the WTO. They found that the EU’s role in IOs 
can change but also that it is quite constant. The EU did not necessarily have the strongest formal role 
in IOs where their competences are the strongest, instead the EU’s role in IOs was dependant on 
whether the IO was established before or after the establishment of the EC/EU, as well as the 
acceptance from other members of the IO both EU and non-EU Members (Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, 
Saenen & Verschaeve, 2014). 
If we apply their different possible statuses for the EU in IOs to our analysis it seems that the EU has 
gone from being an attendant to an observer in the UNGA, as the EU, after the mandate change is able 
to table proposals. Whereas prior to the mandate change, the EU could only attend meetings and not 
table proposals. The analysis in this thesis shows that this is not only evident in the legal status of the 
EU at the UN, but also in the changes in actual involvement of the EU in the MDG and SDG processes. 
The EU is a more central actor especially in the intergovernmental negotiations in the SDG process, 
where it presented common negotiation positions and represented the Member States in informal 
negotiations. 
7.1.2 Policy area and competencies 
Gehring, Oberthur & Mühleck (2013) found that it was the EU’s governance mechanisms in a given 
area, more than its formal status in the IO, which determined whether it was perceived to be a 
relevant actor. Our analysis has shown that one of the reasons why the EU has been more involved in 
the SDGs, is that the policy areas in the agreement are more in line with the EU’s policies, than they 
were in the MDG case. The Commission changed its development policy to focus more on poverty 
reduction and the SDGs also have more focus on environmental issues compared to the MDGs, which 
is an issue the Commission emphasises greatly (Interview F, l 93-113). Furthermore, a basic tenet of 
the SDGs is that they apply to all countries and do not merely focus on the developing countries. The 
SDGs, therefore, have an effect on EU Member States’ policies, something that was not the case in the 
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MDGs to the same extent, which means the EU become affected as well and therefore relevant. As a 
side note, we found that following the MDGs DG DEVCO restructured its development policy around 
the goals in the MDGs and it would, therefore, be very likely to be interested in being part of the SDGs 
since they could have great effect on how the EU is going to structure its development policy in the 
future. To further support the notion that the policy area and the EU’s competences are more 
important than its formal role at the UN, the analysis showed the EU’s involvement in the OWG 
varied across policy fields, with the EU being asked about its position when it came to issues relating 
to its exclusive competences (Interview B, l 218-234). The EU was also able to participate more in the 
informal meetings in the intergovernmental negotiations than some Member States (C, l 417-428), 
which indicates the EU, despite its role as observer, could participate more than some EU Members. 
 
Debaere (2015) studied the EU’s involvement in the G20 and did not find that EU involvement 
depended on its competences, but rather that it depended on the type of negotiations that takes place, 
arguing or bargaining (Debaere, 2015: 126). When arguing, the actor tries to influence other’s 
preferences and convince them to follow her suggestions. The actors do not have fixed preferences or 
interests but are swayed by the better argument, which is the determining factor in decision-making 
(Debaere, 2015: 126). Whereas in bargaining, the actors make use of threats, promises and demands 
and the actors try to maximise their own utility. Bargaining is most likely to occur when negotiating 
politicised issues, whereas arguing occurs in “informal, network-like settings based on non-
hierarchical relations” (Debaere, 2015: 127). Debaere found that bargaining strengthened the EU’s 
position in the negotiations, because it made the EU members act collectively through the EU 
institutions and increased the importance of coordination (Debaere, 2015: 128). When the negotiations 
were dominated by arguing the EU did not represent the EU Member States directly, but acted rather 
autonomously and based its position on agreed positions and standard policies (Debaere, 2015: 132). 
The Commission advocated for the EU not acting as a bloc, because it would hinder the negotiations 
and make a dividing line between the G77 and the G7 (Debaere, 2015: 132). 
The analysis in this thesis seems to differ somewhat from Debaere’s findings. We have found the EU 
representatives advocated for the EU to act as a bloc in the OWG sessions (Interviews: B, l 150-169, E, l 
573-581). This might be due to the fact, that the SDGs would also have to be fulfilled by the EU 
Member States, which politicised the goals to a greater extent than discussing ways to create growth 
in developing countries in the G20. The Member States had the opinion that bloc building would 
hinder the constructive dialog, especially with the G77 countries (Interviews: B, l 150-169, E, l 579-580) 
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and they chose a looser and less restrictive tactic instead (Interviews: A, l 204-206, B, l 150-169, E, l 124-
128). This rejection of the bloc building tactic would suggest that the Member States saw the OWG 
discussions as an arguing process rather than a bargaining process. However, this changed when the 
SDG process reached the intergovernmental stage. During this stage EU Member States requested 
more EU coordination and more common EU negotiation positions (Interview E, l 579-584), which 
suggests that the intergovernmental negotiations had more bargaining elements. This means that as in 
the G20, the EU’s involvement at the UN is also affected by whether the negotiations are dominated 
by arguing or bargaining, although the EU did not have more autonomy during the arguing phase. 
7.1.3 Lisbon effect on EU coordination at the UN 
Our analysis shows that the Lisbon Treaty has given the EU a more central role in coordination at the 
UN. The EU was coordinating the Member States in a pre-MDG process at the UN conferences in the 
1990s, but did not play a major coordination role in converting the result from the conferences into the 
MDGs (Interview Y, l 43-44). In the SDGs the EU coordinated with the Member States throughout the 
process and in the intergovernmental negotiations represented the Member States. This is in part due 
to the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty replaced the Council Presidency as the EU representative at 
the UN with the Commission and the EEAS and gave the EU a stronger coordination role in IOs. The 
clarified and stronger role for the EU at the UN gave the EU legitimacy and acceptance from the 
Member States to undertake a stronger coordination role. This is somewhat in line with Molnar's 
(2012) findings. He employed both qualitative (interviews) and quantitative methods (voting 
statistics) to study if the Lisbon Treaty indeed had increased EU coordination at the UN. The results 
from the qualitative interviews seem to be in line with our findings. Molnar found that 
 
“the dominant trend has been an increasingly ‘cooperative’ or ‘positive’ approach, and a more 
smoothly-running coordination process among Member States and EU actors, as well as an improving 
atmosphere for internal, as well as external collaboration.” (Molnar, 2012: 342). 
 
In the quantitative part of his analysis Molnar examined to what degree the EU Member States voted 
as a bloc before and after the Lisbon Treaty, when voting in the UNGA. This means that he discarded 
all resolutions that were passed by consensus (Molnar, 2012: 343-344). He found that for the 65th 
session of the UNGA the voting cohesion was 70%, which was comparable to some of the sessions 
prior to the Lisbon Treaty with low EU voting cohesion. For the 66th session Molnar found that EU 
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voting cohesion was at 80% which is comparable to sessions prior to the Lisbon Treaty with high EU 
voting cohesion (ibid: 345). He concluded “while Lisbon has changed a great many things, this change 
is not reflected in how its Parties vote in the UNGA” (ibid. We would add that this quantitative part of 
Molnar’s analysis has some methodological issues. Molnar discarded all resolutions that were passed 
with consensus, which he recognized was the norm in the UNGA (ibid: 343-344) and therefore missed 
a lot of cases where the EU cohesion was 100%. By discarding the normal cases that are passed by 
consensus, he is left with the cases that could be defined as outliers or special. This method is further 
vulnerable to a situation where a non-EU country changes position on a certain issue and blocks 
resolutions being passed by consensus. These issues that previously would be passed by consensus 
would now be included in Molnar’s sample and thus increase the percentage of EU cohesion, 
compared to before the non-EU country changed its position. Even though the EU cohesion has not 
increased in reality, the only thing that has changed is the non-EU country request for a vote. It is 
therefore questionable to what extent Molnar’s quantitative findings can be used as representing the 
general level of consensus between the EU Member States when voting in the UNGA. 
7.2 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to see how our results fit in the larger context of the EU in IOs. This 
chapter therefore discussed how our findings relate to the insights regarding the EU in IOs presented 
in the literature review. More specifically, insights from studies using other theories than PA theory. 
Our conclusions fit with most of the studies reviewed in this chapter. 
We found that the consistency sought by the EU when participating at the UN changed over time in a 
similar way to what Kissack (2014) found regarding EU participation in the ILO. Using Debaere, De 
Ville, Orbie, Saenen & Verschaeve’s (2014) terms, we found the EU’s role changed over time from 
being an attendant to an observer, who can now table proposals. DG DEVCO was restructured and 
the policy areas in the SDGs affect EU policy more than the MDGs did, which is in line with Gehring, 
Oberthur & Mühleck (2013) conclusions that it is the EU’s governance mechanisms that determine 
their involvement, not their formal role. 
However, not all our findings are completely in accord with previous studies. Unlike Debaere (2015), 
our results did not show the EU to have more autonomy when the type of negotiations were 
dominated by arguing, but it did have a stronger coordination role when the negotiations were 
dominated by bargaining. Our results show more EU coordination after the Lisbon Treaty, which fit 
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with what Molnar (2012) found in his qualitative study, but not with his quantitative findings. 
However, the quantitative results are questionable. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to investigate the factors of the relationship between the EU and the Member States, 
which determined EU involvement in developing the Millennium Development Goals and 
Sustainable Development Goals and how that involvement was affected by the Lisbon Treaty. We 
studied the EU’s involvement in the MDG and SDG processes in order to isolate the effects of the 
Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s involvement in the UN processes. We have conducted a structured and 
focused controlled case comparison study based on interviews. This research method entails asking 
the same questions of each case, based on insights from our theoretical framework, the PA theory, 
especially the theoretical concepts of control mechanisms and moral hazards. These theoretical 
concepts were further divided to increase their specificity. Control mechanisms were divided into ex-
ante and ex-post and moral hazards were split into drifting, shirking, and slippage. Using this 
approach enabled the analysis to identify several factors that affected the EU’s involvement in the 
MDG and SDG processes. 
 
One factor was the lack of willingness by the Member States to be subject to a strong EU coordination 
in the processes. In the MDG process the Member States did not trust DG DEVCO sufficiently to allow 
it to be active. This lack of trust from the Member States was a result of DG DEVCO’s previous 
development programmes being organised according to some Member States’ interests, instead of 
best practices. When negotiations to develop the MDGs took place, DG DEVCO was being 
restructured so it could regain the trust of the Member States. The willingness of the Member States to 
be subject to a strong EU coordination was also a factor in the SDG process. Although the Member 
States wanted to be far more coordinated in the SDG process by having the EU present common 
positions at the UN, they still resisted the idea of the EU negotiating on their behalf in the OWG 
sessions. 
 
A second factor that was identified in the analysis was the EU’s willingness to coordinate the Member 
States. During the MDG negotiations DG DEVCO was, as mentioned above, being restructured. DG 
DEVCO wanted to focus on getting its own house in order, before engaging in external negotiations. 
This meant that they took a passive role in the MDG negotiations. Whereas in the SDG process, the EU 
coordinated the Member States and presented common positions in the OWG. Furthermore, EU 
officials represented the Member States in informal negotiations, specifically to gain their trust. 
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The third factor was the policy content of the goals. The MDGs were centred around poverty 
reductions and were to be met by developing countries, while the SDGs combined both development 
and environment issues. The Commission had already been quite involved with environment issues 
and have since the agreement on the MDGs restructured its development policy quite extensively. The 
fact that the content of the SDGs suited the EU better, combined with the fact that the EU countries 
also promised to fulfil the SDGs, made it more relevant for the EU to be involved. 
 
The fourth factor is the EU’s resources. We found that the EU did quite extensive analyses of text 
proposals from the OWG co-chairs in the SDG process. These analyses were greatly appreciated by 
some Member States and confirmed that the EU was able to contribute to the Member States’ work in 
the OWG. At the intergovernmental negotiations the EU had sufficient diplomatic resources that it 
could have representatives present in many of the informal meetings and negotiations. 
 
In our analysis we identified how the EU was affected by the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. Based 
on our comparative analysis between the EU’s involvement in the MDG and SDG processes we found 
that the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty meant that the EU could take a more active role in 
negotiations. This is because the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU a clear coordination mandate in IOs, 
which is illustrated by the fact that the EU Member States requested more EU coordination in the 
intergovernmental negotiations and that the OWG co-chairs requested more EU coordination in the 
OWG. This request for more coordination from both EU Member States as well as outside actors, 
shows that the EU’s coordination role at the UN has become more legitimate, compared to the MDG 
process, where the Member States did not want any EU coordination. It also seems to have affected 
the EU’s involvement in the process that with the Lisbon Treaty the EU did not have to be represented 
by the Council Presidency at the UN. Replacing the Council President with the EU’s representative in 
the UN meant that the EU got a new mandate to be able to perform its role at the UN. This new 
mandate gave the EU representatives the right to speak at the UN and table proposals. This 
strengthened the EU’s coordination capabilities as it can present common positions and common 
proposals in the UN, without having to go through a Council President from the Member States. 
 
There are two important implications of these findings. The first implication is in relation to the 
insights presented in the literature review.  Results are similar to the findings in Molnar’s (2012) 
qualitative part, Kissack (2014), Gehring, Oberthur & Mühleck (2013), Damro (2007), as well as 
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Nedergaard & Jensen (2014). However, our results did not fit with the conclusions in Molnar’s (2012) 
quantitative part, Debaere (2015), nor Niemann & Huigens (2001). This implies that, although, there 
are different methods and theories that are utilised to study the EU in IOs, there are some similarities 
in the results they produce and the findings made studying one IO can sometimes explain dynamics 
in other IOs. 
 
The second important implication regards the theoretical assumptions in PA-theory. The chapter on 
theory presented criticism of PA theory’s theoretical assumption especially regarding the narrow 
focus on efficiency and material gain as motivations for action and inaction (Pollack 2007). Our 
findings suggest the EU was motivated by trust issues. The EU did not take part in the MDG 
negotiations as they wanted to focus on getting its own house in order and gain the trust of the 
Member States. Trust also seems to be an important motivational factor in the SDG process, where 
many of the actions taken by the EU are motivated by increasing the Member States’ trust in their 
ability to play a central role in the negotiations and defend European interests. With that in mind we 
suggest that PA theory is adjusted to take into account immaterial rewards and sanctions. It would 
somewhat alter the way the principal-agent relationship is viewed, especially considering that the core 
assumption involves differences in preferences, and in our case these differences do not conflict 
significantly. 
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